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PRESSING FOR SENTENCE? AN EXAMINATION
OF THE NEW ZEALAND CROWN PROSECUTOR’S ROLE
IN SENTENCING
ABSTRACT. Prosecutors are among the most powerful actors in any criminal
justice system. Their exercise of discretion, however, has not been subjected to the
same level of public and empirical scrutiny as other parts of the criminal justice
system. To deepen understanding, I empirically explore for the first time the form,
function and limits of the New Zealand Crown Prosecutor’s role at the sentencing
stage of the criminal justice process. Semi-structured interviews of a non-represen-
tative sample of ten Crown Prosecutors are analysed using Hawkins’ framework of
‘‘surround’’, ‘‘field’’ and ‘‘frame’’. Findings suggest that whilst New Zealand’s regime
shares history, principles, and structural features with English and Australian re-
gimes, it goes further to permit Crown Prosecutors a more assertive role in sen-
tencing. In the surround’, populist and managerial pressures create frustration,
strain, and concern. Changes to funding models suggest the potential for unjust
sentencing outcomes has increased. The ‘‘surround’’ also intrudes upon and trans-
forms decision-making ‘‘frames’’. The opinions and presence of stakeholders influ-
ences decisions and practices at office and individual levels. Justice may be reactive,
forward-looking, or negotiated depending on the particular mix of individuals in-
volved – something accentuated by the regime’s privatised and decentralised form.
Findings also suggest that Crown Prosecutors ‘‘frame’’ their role in occupational
terms. The lack of interest of universities, professional bodies, and law and policy-
makers in offering or requiring prosecutorial training before entry to the role is
influential. This renders decision-making more susceptible to pressures in the ‘‘sur-
round’’ and ‘‘field’’, and increases variation in decision-making ‘‘frames’’.
I INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors are among the most powerful actors in any criminal
justice system. While they are not everywhere the same, their dis-
cretion is ‘‘broader, more often available, and less constrained’’ than
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that of other actors.1 They may decide what offences to prosecute,
whom to charge, whether to negotiate charges, how zealously to
pursue conviction, and – in some regimes – what sentence is held
appropriate by the court at the sentencing stage of the criminal justice
process.2 The prosecutorial role is such that it is ‘‘unique, central and
pivotal’’ with ‘‘wide-reaching, reverberating effects’’ upon the deci-
sion-making of other actors.3
In view of the role’s power and scope, prosecutorial discretion is
often limited by rules and ethical postures.4 These include obligations
to be ‘‘dispassionate and impartial’’5, to ‘‘elicit truth’’6, to ‘‘do jus-
tice’’7, and to ‘‘act in the public interest’’8. Hence prosecutors are
variously considered ‘‘ministers of justice’’9, ‘‘quasi-judicial’’10 and
‘‘proactively adjudicative’’11. In so limiting discretion, law and pol-
1 B. Frederick and D. Stemen, The Anatomy of Discretion: An Analysis of
Prosecutorial Decision Making (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2012).
2 J. Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995); M. Tonry, ‘‘Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Per-
spectives’’, (2012) 41 Crime & Justice 1–33.
3 J. Fionda (n 2 above) at 1.
4 A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 4th ed, 2010).
5 K. Hawkins, Law as Law Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory
Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
6 W. Gourlie, ‘‘Role of the Prosecutor: Fair Minister with Firm Convictions’’,
(1982) 16(2) U.B.C. L. Rev. 295.
7 B. Green, ‘‘Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice’?’’, (1998) 26(3) Fordham Urb.
L.J. 607.
8 D. Paciocco, Getting Away with Murder: The Canadian Criminal Justice System
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 1999).
9 G. Mitchell, ‘‘No Joy in This for Anyone: Reflections on the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion in R v Latimer’’, (2001) 64 Sask. L. Rev. 491.
10 Law Reform Commission Of Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecutions: The
Attorney General and the Crown Prosecutor (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission Of
Canada, Working Paper 62, 1990); H. Shawcross, (1951) 188 Parl Deb HC (5th Ser.)
Col. 981 (UK).
11 J. Jackson, ‘‘The Ethical Implications of the Enhanced Role of the Prosecutor’’,
(2006) 9(1) Legal Ethics 35.
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icy-makers seek to provide coherence and transparency to policies
determined through the role.12
This paper explores one aspect of the prosecutorial role, namely its
form, function and limits at the sentencing stage of the criminal
justice process. It seeks to describe, understand and evaluate the
practice whereby New Zealand Crown Prosecutors recommend a
sentence range or tariff to the court in written and oral submissions.
It is important to understand how and why such recommendations
are made given their potential impact on sentencing outcomes,
offenders, victims, and public confidence in the administration of
justice.13 It is also important to understand how justifiable the
practice is given the rules and ethical postures attributed to the role,
and its central position within the criminal justice system.
While ‘‘sentencing’’ is commonly understood as the judicial
function performed after a conviction has been entered, the aware-
ness of this paper is wider. ‘‘Sentencing’’ is here more broadly
understood to encompass a criminal justice system actor’s ability to
influence the penalty imposed on an offender in response to an of-
fence. When so conceived, sentencing falls squarely within the remit
of Crown Prosecutors. Their discretion flows back and forth through
the criminal justice process, and extends to all decision-making
points.14 As ‘‘sentencers’’, they have both indirect and direct influence
upon sentencing and its outcomes.
Significantly, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion has not been
subjected to the same level of public and empirical scrutiny as other
parts of the criminal justice system.15 Excepting a few book-length
case studies of one or several countries, and some descriptive articles
and compilations, comparative knowledge about prosecution systems
in the common law world is largely anecdotal.16 ‘‘Studies of prose-
cutorial processes, decision making, and outcomes based on original
12 A. Perrodet, ‘‘The Public Prosecutor’’, in M. Delmas-Marty and J. Spencer
(eds), European Criminal Procedures, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
13 T. Tyler, Why Do People Obey The Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2006).
14 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield, ‘‘Introduction’’, in L. Gelsthorpe and N. Pad-
field (eds), Exercising Discretion (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003).
15 B. Frederick and D. Stemen (above n 1).
16 J. Fionda (above n 2). This excludes empirical research on prosecution regimes
in the United States, which have a political dimension that renders them ‘‘unique in
the world and in an important sense lawless’’: M. Tonry (above n 2) at 5.
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empirical research are almost non-existent’’.17 Indeed, only one pre-
vious empirical study has systematically explored and focused on the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in sentencing.
Fionda’s study explored the exercise of discretion by prosecutors
in sentencing in Scotland, the Netherlands and Germany, and con-
sidered the implications for potential reform of the Crown Prosecu-
tion Service (‘‘CPS’’) in England and Wales (‘‘England’’). It
concluded the European prosecutors had moved towards a ‘‘more
important and wider’’ model of sentencing involvement; that this was
explainable under various posited criminal justice system models
which affect the scope of prosecutorial discretion; and that this shift
should extend to England given Crown Prosecutors’ entrenched,
indirect influence upon the sentencing process and outcomes.18
More recent comparative empirical studies have explored and
evaluated prosecutors’ broader roles and functions in various Euro-
pean criminal justice systems.19 Like Fionda’s study, prosecutorial
powers were on the whole observed to be expanding. In particular,
prosecutors’ ability to decide how to end and process cases, i.e. how
to actually deal with offenders, was considered one of the most
strongly evolving fields; prosecutors control alternative procedural
forms in which they, if not formally, effectively pre-determine court
decisions in the majority of cases. A filtering and more adjuidicatory
role for prosecutors was observed to be evolving.20
While such studies have illuminated key reasons for change in the
prosecutor’s role in sentencing, comparative questions remain for
which there are presently no answers – some apply to New Zealand.
It is unclear why and how Crown Prosecutors have come to possess a
17 M. Tonry (above n 2) at 26.
18 J. Fionda (above n 2) at 5.
19 See: J.-M. Jehle and M. Wade (eds), Coping with Overloaded Criminal Justice
Systems. The Rise of Prosecutorial Power across Europe (Berlin, Springer, 2006),
which explored England and Wales, France, German, the Netherlands, Poland and
Sweden; and J.-M. Jehle, M. Wade and B. Elsner, ‘‘Prosecution and Diversion within
Criminal Justice Systems in Europe. Aims and Design of a Comparative Study’’,
(2008) 14 Eur J Crim Policy Res 93, which followed up and expanded the aforesaid to
include Croatia, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey.
20 M. Wade, ‘‘The Power to Decide – Prosecutorial Control, Diversion and
Punishment in European Criminal Justice Systems Today’’, in J.-M. Jehle and M.
Wade (above n 19) at 109–110; J.-M. Jehle, P. Smit and J. Zila, ‘‘The Public
Prosecutor as Key-Player: Prosecutorial Case-Ending Decisions, (2008) 14 Eur J
Crim Policy Res 161; and M. Wade, P. Smith, B.A. Cavarlay, ‘‘The Prosecution Role
where Courts Decide Cases’’, (2008) 14 Eur J Crim Policy Res 133.
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more active sentencing role than their counterparts in other common
law countries; it is unclear whether this role is consistent with the
rules and ethical postures attributed to it; and it is unclear whether it
renders New Zealand’s regime superior or inferior to those of other
countries. Gaining insight into these issues are the aims of this paper.
Three research questions are posited:
1. What is the New Zealand Crown Prosecutor’s role in sentencing
under existing law and policy documents?
2. How do they understand and perform this role?
3. What do their explanations and experiences mean for current
policy?
Specific attention is drawn to the fact the paper was inspired and
informed by my six years’ of employment as a New Zealand Crown
Prosecutor. As such, the epistemological perspective adopted, re-
search design employed, and data analysis conducted were all influ-
enced by my inside knowledge and experience of prosecution and
sentencing. The research perspective utilised was that of a ‘‘practi-
tioner researcher’’. This acknowledged my investment in the culture
researched and motivation to develop scholarly and professional
understanding about the Crown Prosecutor’s role in sentencing.21
The paper expands what is known about the role in important
ways. It empirically explores New Zealand’s regime for the first
time22 using qualitative data collected via semi-structured interviews
with a non-representative sample of ten Crown Prosecutors. It em-
ploys socio-legal theory on discretion in the data analysis, notably
Hawkins’ analytic framework of ‘‘surround’’, ‘‘field’’ and ‘‘frame’’.23
It also uses the regimes of England and Australia (specifically the
state of Victoria) as background features against which to compare
New Zealand’s regime; timely given the dated nature of Fionda’s
study and a recent Australian decision that prohibits prosecutorial
recommendations on sentence.
Given limitations to the research, the paper is akin to a pilot study.
My hope is that its findings will shed light on this understudied area
21 J. Reed and S. Proctor, ‘‘Practitioner Research in Context’’, in J. Reed and S.
Proctor (eds), Practitioner Research in Health Care (London: Chapman and Hall,
1995).
22 J. Hodgson and A. Roberts, ‘‘Criminal process and prosecution’’, in P. Cane
and H. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012).
23 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
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and prompt further research. To this end, it begins with a back-
ground discussion in Part 2 on the Crown Prosecutor’s role and what
it entails in sentencing. The key rules and ethical postures are ex-
plained. Part 3 expands on the core issues with a literature review.
Debates on the appropriateness of the prosecutorial role in sentenc-
ing are engaged with, the models posited in Fionda’s study are ex-
plored, and the relevance and application of socio-legal theory on
discretion is discussed.
Part 4 addresses the research methodology and analytic frame-
work. Issues encountered during implementation are discussed, along
with research ethics. Parts 5–7 then address key themes that arose
from the data analysis in the ‘‘surround’’ (Part 5), the ‘‘field’’ (Part 6),
and in apparent ‘‘frames’’ (Part 7). Part 8 then concludes the paper,
with possible implications for the New Zealand Crown Prosecutor’s
role in sentencing discussed, and areas for further research suggested.
II BACKGROUND
2.1 Prosecutorial Role
As a British-colonised nation, New Zealand has inherited the com-
mon law’s institutions and conventions.24 This applies also to Aus-
tralia’s legal system (and its federal, state and territorial
jurisdictions).25 With nine prosecution regimes – the Commonwealth,
six states, and two territories – a detailed review of each is beyond the
scope of this paper. Only the state of Victoria is referenced, being
representative and most comprehensively prescribed. Like England,
Victoria is used as a background feature against which New Zeal-
and’s regime is compared.
All three countries are similar in terms of their prosecution insti-
tutions. Crown Prosecutors are lawyers designated by a superior law
officer; with functional autonomy from the executive; accountability
vested in a superior law’s officer superintendence; largely secondary
decision-making powers; and their role founded in many documents.
A notable difference in New Zealand, however, is that prosecution
24 New Zealand Law Commission, Criminal Prosecution: A Discussion Paper
(Wellington: New Zealand Law Commission, 1997) at 21; A. Britton, ‘‘The Role of
the Prosecutor in relation to Victim Impact Statements: An Examination of the New
Zealand Regime’’, (2014) 2 N.Z.L. Rev. 171.
25 Ministry of Justice, Examining the Prosecution Systems of England and Wales,
Canada, Australia and Scotland (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2011).
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decisions are made by Crown Solicitors – private practitioners in law
firms,26 appointed by the Attorney-General on warrant of the
Governor-General, to prosecute crime in certain areas.27 In England
and Australia, decisions are instead made by independent agencies –
the CPS and Directors of Public Prosecutions (‘‘DPP’’) respectively.
In each country, the prosecutorial role is important for under-
standing how the criminal justice system works. Crown Prosecutors
assist the state to advance both moral and instrumental claims to its
legitimacy.28 They facilitate the ‘‘visible expression of authority of the
state’’, display the ‘‘implementation of the law’s formal mandate’’,
and reflect the ‘‘peculiar power of the law and legal processes to
publicize, dramatize, and emphasize’’.29 All this is made possible by
the principle of ‘‘discretionary prosecution’’30, which confers upon
Crown Prosecutors great powers, far-reaching rights, and an ability
to impact the implementation of policy.31
Central to Crown Prosecutors’ power and rights is the permitted
scope of their ‘‘discretion’’. ‘‘Discretion’’ has been defined as the
mandated or assumed ability of an actor to choose among alternative
courses of action or inaction.32 It may arise from formal rules, their
interpretation, or choices about their relevance and use.33 Impor-
tantly, in the criminal justice system, it is a ‘‘bottom to top’’ para-
digm34 with the most important decisions made at the bottom of
organisations.35 As a gatekeeper to, and controller of, various
26 Ordinarily, these law firms cannot represent defendants in proceedings against
the Crown.
27 Crown Law, Crown Solicitor Network (Wellington: Crown Law), at: http://
crownlaw.govt.nz/about-us/crown-solicitor-network/.
28 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
29 Ibid at 11.
30 A. Perrodet (above n 12).
31 A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne (above n 4).
32 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14).
33 K. Davis, Discretionary Justice (Louisiana: Louisiana University Press, 1969);
D. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986).
34 L. Ohlin and F. Remington, Discretion in Criminal Justice: The Tension Between
Individualization and Uniformity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993)
at xiv.
35 M. Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public
Services (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 2010).
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stakeholders’ transitions through the criminal justice process, Crown
Prosecutors’ discretion is especially wide.36
Although discretion is conferred to ‘‘preserve flexibility’’37 and
‘‘do justice to difference’’38, its subjective quality may allow unequal,
unfavorable or unjustifiable decisions.39 For this reason, Crown
Prosecutors’ decision-making powers are routinely limited or struc-
tured by rules or ethical postures. In all three countries, this occurs
through the periodical issuance of guidelines, practice directions,
codes, pledges, charters and schemes – these seek to achieve ‘‘con-
sistency and common standards’’ in prosecutorial values and deci-
sion-making.40 Rules of professional conduct and client care also
have influence, albeit to a lesser extent.
Three key principles – aspects of the rule of law – inform the rules
or ethical postures of Crown Prosecutors in all three countries, and
thus the exercise of their discretion.41 Foremost is prosecutorial
‘‘independence’’. This requires that Crown Prosecutors’ decisions are
free from influence: they represent the ‘‘public interest…not the
government, the police, the victim or any other person’’.42 In New
Zealand, the Prosecution Guidelines (‘‘Guidelines’’) deem this principle
a ‘‘central tenet’’ of the regime.43 In England and Australia, it
motivated the very advent of the CPS and DPP offices.44
The requirement that Crown Prosecutors act in the ‘‘public
interest’’ underlies their discretion’s reach. Where it rests in any case
36 T. Weigend, ‘‘A Judge by Another Name? Comparative Perspectives on the
Role of the Public Prosecutor’’, in E. Luna and M. Wade (eds), The Prosecutor In
Transnational Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
37 C. Schneider, ‘‘Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer’s View’’, in K. Hawkins (ed),
The Uses of Discretion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
38 B. Hudson, ‘‘Doing Justice to Difference’’, in A. Ashworth and M. Wasik (eds),
Fundamentals Of Sentencing Theory: Essays in Honour of Andrew von Hirsch (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
39 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14); K. Hawkins, ‘‘The Use of Legal
Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science’’, in K. Hawkins (ed), The
Uses of Discretion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
40 Crown Law, Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines (Wellington: Crown
Law, 2013).
41 C. Corns, Public Prosecutions in Australia: Law, Policy and Practice (Sydney:
Thomson Reuters, 2014).
42 Department of Public Prosecutions, Director’s Policy: Prosecutorial Ethics
(Melbourne: Department of Public Prosecutions, 2014) at 1.
43 Crown Law (above n 40) at 6.
44 J. Jackson (above n 11).
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requires the weighing of non-exclusive reasons for and against
prosecution.45 In England, the CPS Code for Crown Prosecutors
(‘‘Code’’) reduces these to broad questions.46 Such reasons and
questions reflect the three countries’ legality and expediency priorities
across evidential sufficiency, culpability, law enforcement, and re-
source management grounds.47 However, with little guidance as to
the weighing exercise and ‘‘few clear public expectations’’, the scope
for discretion is great.48
The second principle each country subscribes to, and which dove-
tails with the first, is prosecutorial ‘‘impartiality’’. Crown Prosecutors
must apply consistent, objective and transparent considerations in all
cases.49 Courts have long accepted that they represent the general
community via their ‘‘minister of justice’’ and ‘‘quasi-judicial’’ func-
tions. These enjoin them to perform obligations in a ‘‘detached’’ and
‘‘objective’’ manner, ‘‘impartially’’ and ‘‘dispassionately’’, and to
eschew ‘‘prejudice and emotion’’. As will be discussed, Australia goes
further still to prohibit Crown Prosecutors expressing personal
opinions in sentencing.
Lastly, all three countries acknowledge the principle of prosecu-
torial ‘‘fairness’’. In New Zealand, this is the ‘‘overarching duty’’ of
Crown Prosecutors and reflects their connection to community.50
While they may act as ‘‘strong advocates’’ and prosecute cases
‘‘forcefully in a firm and vigorous manner’’, they must act ‘‘fairly’’,
including towards defendants.51 This means they should not ‘‘strive
for a conviction’’ but help to ‘‘secure justice’’.52 Responsibilities
follow – such as disclosure – and connect to defendants’ fair trial
right – something recognised by all three countries.
45 Crown Law (above n 40); Department of Public Prosecutions, Director’s Policy:
Prosecutorial Discretion (Melbourne: Department of Public Prosecutions, 2014).
46 N. Padfield and J. Bild, Text and Materials on the Criminal Justice Process
(Oxford: Routledge, 5th ed, 2016).
47 J. Fionda and A. Ashworth, ‘‘The New Code for Crown Prosecutors: Part 1:
Prosecution, Accountability and the Public Interest’’, (1994) Crim. L. Rev. 894.
48 A. Ashworth, ‘‘The Public Interest’ Element in Prosecutions’’, (1987) Crim. L.
Rev. 597 at 602.
49 C. Corns (above n 41).
50 Crown Law (above n 40).
51 Ibid.
52 Crown Prosecution Service, The Code for Crown Prosecutors (London: Crown
Prosecution Service, 7th ed, 2013).
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2.2 Prosecutorial Role in Sentencing
The three principles carry over to the prosecutorial role in sentencing.
Historically, Crown Prosecutors in New Zealand, Australia, and
England played little procedural or substantive role beyond the ver-
dict stage.53 In a classical doctrinal articulation of this position,
Humphreys opined:54
When the summing up is reached, the duty of Crown counsel is largely dis-
charged, for in the matter of sentence he will exercise no grain of pressure
towards severity, and will leave his opponent to say what he may in the matter
of mitigation.
When and why such a ‘‘restraining rule’’ developed remains unclear.
Some contend that it dates back to when most offences carried the
death penalty, with ‘‘nothing further to be said by either side’’.55
Others note that reports of criminal cases in the 18th Century contain
‘‘plenty of examples’’ of Crown Prosecutors submitting on sentence.56
Irrespective of origins, the procedural and substantive format of
Crown Prosecutors’ role in sentencing has changed significantly.
Presently in all three countries, they are duty-bound to ‘‘assist the
court’’ in reaching a sentence and to prevent it from falling into
‘‘appealable error’’. This requires them to proactively draw sentenc-
ing judges’ attention to relevant information, including:57
…aggravating or mitigating factors disclosed by the prosecution case, any
victim impact statement and evidence of the impact on the community, sen-
tencing guidelines or precedents as well as relevant law regarding ancillary
orders for compensation, confiscation, or anti-social behaviour orders.
Such obligations feature in the documents that regulate the role in
each country, with their articulation in Victoria’s regime being most
comprehensive. Collectively, they signal a shift towards a more
53 M. Tonry (above n 2).
54 C. Humphreys, ‘‘The Duties and Responsibilities of Prosecuting Counsel’’,
(1955) Crim. L. Rev. 739 at 747.
55 T. O’Malley, ‘‘Sentencing & the Prosecutor’’, in 9th National Prosecutors’
Conference (Dublin: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, 24 May, 2008) at
2.
56 J. Spencer, ‘‘Do We Need A Prosecution Appeal Against Sentence?’’, (1987)
Crim. L. Rev. 724 at 733.
57 S. Vasiliev, ‘‘Trial’’, in L. Reydams, J. Wouters and C. Ryngaert (eds), Inter-
national Prosecutors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 783.
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important and wider model of prosecutorial involvement in sen-
tencing.58
At common law, two main factors have contributed towards this
shift.59 The first is the adversarial process’s natural inclination to view
parties as better-placed to provide the court with relevant informa-
tion and to challenge respective positions. The second is the advent of
appellate review of undue lenience at sentencing – something that has
been influential for New Zealand’s regime.60 Interestingly, across the
three countries, the appeal right first appeared in Victoria in 1914,61
New Zealand in 1967,62 and England in 1988.63 Greater explanatory
weight may thus lie with the first factor stated above.
The shift’s highpoint in each country turns on whether they permit
Crown Prosecutors to make recommendations as to the appropriate
sentence in submissions to the court. In New Zealand, they must ‘‘not
press for a particular term of imprisonment or any other sentence’’
but may submit a ‘‘view as to the appropriate sentence range or
tariff’’.64 In England, the position is equivalent.65 Until recently, it
was also widely the practice in Australia.66 As recent as 2008, in R v
58 Crown Prosecutors in England additionally possess unique dispositional powers
to informally divert matters from prosecution, for instance, via conditional cautions
and deferred prosecution agreements. See: C. Lewis, ‘‘The Prosecution Service
Function within the English Criminal Justice System’’, in J.-M. Jehle and M. Wade
(above n 19) at 151.
59 S. Vasiliev (above n 57).
60 Crown Law, Prosecution Guidelines (Wellington: Crown Law, 1992) at para 8.1.
61 Sentencing Advisory Council, Key Events for Sentencing in Victoria (Mel-
bourne: Sentencing Advisory Council), at: https://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.
au/about-sentencing/timeline-sentencing-in-victoria.
62 New Zealand House of Representatives, Debates (Wellington: New Zealand
House of Representatives) at 490–505 (15 June 1966) and 3294–3313 (12 October
1966); New Zealand House of Representatives, Statutes Revision Committee Report
on Crimes Amendment Bill (Wellington: New Zealand House of Representatives,
1966).
63 D. Thomas, ‘‘Judicial Discretion in Sentencing’’, in L. Gelsthorpe and N.
Padfield (eds), Exercising Discretion (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003).
64 Crown Law (above n 40) at 21.
65 Crown Prosecution Service (above n 52); N. Padfield and J. Bild (above n 46).
66 I. Temby, ‘‘The Role of the Prosecutor in the Sentencing Process’’, in I. Potas
(ed), Sentencing In Australia: Issues, Policy and Reform (Canberra: Australian
Institute of Criminology, 1986); J. Willis, ‘‘Some Aspects of the Prosecutor’s Role at
Sentencing’’, in ‘‘Prosecuting Justice’’ Conference, 18–19 April 1996 Melbourne
(Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1996).
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MacNeil-Brown (2008) 20 VR 677, the Victorian Court of Appeal
held that, if asked by a sentencing judge, Crown Prosecutors were
duty-bound to submit what they considered to be the available range
of sentences.
Things changed dramatically with the High Court’s decision in
Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen [2014] HCA 2.67 Crucially,
the majority held at paragraph [7] of the judgment:
The prosecution’s statement of what are the bounds of the available range of
sentences is a statement of opinion. Its expression advances no proposition of
law or fact a sentencing judge may properly take into account in finding the
relevant facts, deciding the applicable principles of law or applying those
principles to the facts to yield the sentence to be imposed. That being so, the
prosecution is not required, and should not be permitted, to make such a
statement of bounds to a sentencing judge.
The ruling’s significance is threefold: it confirmed the restraining
rule’s continued application to Crown Prosecutors; it reasserted
Australia’s commitment to an ‘‘individualist’’ approach to sentenc-
ing; and it reinforced the primacy of judicial independence.68 These
latter two connected factors require elaboration.
All three countries subscribe to a ‘‘just-deserts’’ view of sentenc-
ing: offenders should be sentenced by reason of, and proportionate
to, their desert for offending, and sentencing outcomes should reflect
culpability, as measured in terms of the seriousness of harm caused
and offenders’ responsibility for it.69 However, the way in which each
implements this view differs. New Zealand and England adopt one
approach and Australia another. Crucial for explaining the different
approaches is each country’s commitment to ‘‘consistency’’ in sen-
tencing. This may take either or both of two forms: ‘‘consistency of
approach’’ and ‘‘consistency of outcomes’’.70
67 The High Court is the final court of appeal for all cases.
68 It has since been clarified that Crown Prosecutors’ duties to assist the court and
prevent appealable error continue, and they may submit on the available types of
sentence and their inadequacy only. See Department of Public Prosecutions,
Director’s Policy: The Crown’s Role on Plea and Sentencing Hearing (Melbourne:
Department of Public Prosecutions, 2015).
69 A. von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). All
three countries also recognise that multiple purposes may be served by sentencing,
which reflect retributive, utilitarian, rehabilitative, and restorative concerns.
70 S. Krasnostein and A. Freiberg, ‘‘Pursuing Consistency in an Individualistic
Sentencing Framework: If You Know Where You’re Going, How Do You Know
When You’ve Got There?’’, (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 265.
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New Zealand and England advance both forms via a ‘‘compara-
tivist’’ sentencing approach.71 This seeks to establish offence gravity
or seriousness in light of the harm caused and the offender’s culpa-
bility. It requires that sentencing judges first identify a starting point
that takes into account the aggravating or mitigating factors relating
to the offence and any guiding or constraining mechanisms.72 They
must then evaluate the aggravating or mitigating factors relating to
the offender.73 The approach acknowledges judicial discretion can
and should be structured or limited in the pursuit of consistency, that
process and outcomes are related, and that this does not compromise
judicial independence.
The situation in Australia is very different. Priority is accorded
instead only to ‘‘consistency of approach’’ in sentencing. This stems
from a commitment to an ‘‘individualist’’ approach to sentencing,
which connects fair sentencing outcomes to the existence of largely
unfettered judicial discretion.74 Indeed, the High Court has repeat-
edly held the correct sentencing methodology to be used is ‘‘instinc-
tive’’ or ‘‘intuitive’’ synthesis, whereby ‘‘all relevant considerations
are simultaneously unified, balanced, and weighed’’ by sentencing
judges.75
In view of this different conception of consistency, the structuring
and limiting of judicial discretion also differs in Australia. Case
comparison, starting points, and sentencing ranges are avoided
‘‘other than where they might play a role in ‘‘informing’’ the
instinctive synthesis’’.76 Guideline judgments are considered helpful
but not binding. Although appellate review exists, sentencing judges
are given ‘‘wide latitude’’ with the presence of ‘‘legal error’’ required
for success.77 The coveting of judicial discretion thus reflects an
ideological commitment to judicial independence, with low tolerance
for prosecutorial input in the result.
71 C. French, ‘‘The New Zealand Law Foundation Ethel Benjamin Commemo-
rative Address 2015: The Role of the Judge in Sentencing: From Port-Soaked
Reactionary to Latte Liberal’’, (2015) 14(1) Otago L. Rev. 33.
72 These include sentencing guidelines (in England only), guideline judgments, and
prescriptive statutes.
73 The New Zealand approach includes applying the discount for guilty plea as a
third step.
74 S. Krasnostein and A. Freiberg (above n 70) at 267.
75 Ibid at 268.
76 Ibid at 269.
77 Ibid at 274.
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III LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Appropriateness of Recommending Sentence
Whether it is proper that Crown Prosecutors make recommendations
on sentence has attracted forthright debate. On one side are those
who seek to justify the ‘‘restraining rule’’ from a principled or theo-
retical perspective.78 Crown Prosecutors are public interest watch-
dogs and a duty of fairness follows, with obligations to be impartial
and disinterested in outcomes. Further, prosecutorial influence in
sentencing will breach the constitutional principle of judicial inde-
pendence, which guards against ‘‘undue influence’’ over judicial
decisions so that sentencing judges remain ‘‘autonomous in their
field’’.79 Preventing such a breach is closely linked with the judiciary’s
twin goals of democratic and legal legitimacy.80
At one level, this perspective contends that any recommendations
by Crown Prosecutors will place either sentencing judges or the
prosecution in a difficult position – either might be publically per-
ceived as partial, soft, vengeful or wrong, depending on the recom-
mendation and judicial response to it.81 At another level, it contends
that because Crown Prosecutors are generally more informed than
sentencing judges, their opinions are likely to carry more weight.
Sentencing judges will thus be under undue pressure to accept rec-
ommendations and, when they do, judicial independence will be
compromised.82
On the other side of the debate are those that refute the general-
isation that the prosecution should play no part in sentencing. One
early attack contended:83
78 R v Atkinson [1978] 2 All ER 460 per Lord Scarman; A. Denning, The Road To
Justice (London: Stevens & Sons, 1955) at 36; C. Humphreys (above n 55); J. Willis
(above n 66).
79 J. Fionda (above n 2) at 45.
80 J. Ferejohn and L. Kramer, ‘‘Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Insti-
tutionalizing Judicial Restraint’’, (2002) 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962.
81 J. Willis (above n 66).
82 Ibid. To a lesser extent, this perspective contends that recommendations will
increase the scope in ‘‘plea discussions’’ for improper understandings and agreements
that cannot be delivered upon.
83 A. Ashworth, ‘‘Prosecution and Procedure in Criminal Justice’’, (1979) Crim. L.
Rev. 480 at 486; A. Ashworth (above n 48); J. Fionda (above n 2).
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…that generalisation is so plainly wrong that it does not deserve serious
attention. The involvement of the prosecution in selecting charges, determining
mode of trial and negotiating a change of plea is intimately related to sen-
tence…
This highlights the reach of Crown Prosecutors’ discretion and its
potential impact in sentencing – they are enjoined by the nature of
their role and the criminal justice process to consider the likely and
proper sentence from early on. This has only been heightened with
the advent of the prosecutorial appeal right;84 that they ‘‘should be
concerned about sentence but not concerned in sentencing’’ is said to
be unpersuasive.85
Attention has been drawn to the importance of the adversarial
model of criminal justice. First, the public interest element and the
defendant’s interest, should be represented at sentencing.86 Secondly,
the ‘‘restraining rule’’ is inconsistent with the common law principle
of audi alteram partem, and that it may lead judges to produce
inferior decisions from having heard only half of the argument.87
With the advent of the prosecutorial appeal right, it is also claimed
that natural justice may be breached if Crown Prosecutors do not
communicate to defendants the extent of the case against them or
provide them with a fair opportunity to respond.88 Such arguments
continue to be rejected in Australia, despite being reflective of ac-
cepted practice in other common law jurisdictions like the United
States and Canada.
Finally, supporters of prosecutorial involvement in sentencing
highlight Crown Prosecutors’ role in assisting sentencing judges to
navigate increasingly complex sentencing laws:89
The question which needs to be considered….is whether the offering of expert
advice as a means of guidance through complicated legislative provisions and
precedent, often aimed at achieving greater consistency and fairness, should be
included in this list of undue influences’. It is argued that it should not. Expert
84 I. Temby (above n 66).
85 A. Ashworth (above n 83) at 604.
86 G. Zellick, ‘‘The Role of Prosecuting Counsel in Sentencing’’, (1979) Crim. L.
Rev. 493.
87 J. Spencer (above n 56).
88 I. Campbell, ‘‘The Role of the Prosecutor on Sentence’’, (1985) 9 Criminal Law
Journal 202.
89 J. Fionda (above n 2) at 46.
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advice does not exert undue, or the wrong sort of, influence on judges any more
than the offering of pre-sentence reports by the probation service.
Crucial here is the related assertion that, in this assistance role,
Crown Prosecutors fall under the judicial, rather than the executive,
branch of government. Their input should not be viewed as ‘‘some
form of corruption’’.90
3.2 Relevance of Models of Criminal Justice
The importance of Fionda’s study is that it attempted the first
empirical rebuttal of the noted theoretical objections. It exposed and
justified pressures and constraints on the prosecutorial role in sen-
tencing, and it showed how these have led to more active involve-
ment. Crown Prosecutors’ influence in England was considered
‘‘limited to an indirect, consequential exercise of persuasion related to
their procedural decision-making, except for their power…to appeal
against unduly lenient sentences’’.91 It was also regarded as ‘‘in its
infancy’’ with ‘‘great potential’’92 – the implication was that, over
time, Crown Prosecutors would gain wider sentencing powers.93 As
Chapter 1 showed, this has indeed occurred.
For Fionda, underlying prosecutorial involvement are ‘‘back-
ground factors’’, ‘‘operational philosophies’’ and ‘‘self-reflective
attitudes of practitioners’’. Influential in those regimes studied were:
increased public demands on prosecutors to be seen to be ‘‘doing
something about crime’’; the overburdened nature of criminal justice
systems; increased demands on prosecutors to be efficient and provide
value for money; more complex cases and sentencing statutes; and
‘‘bifurcation’’, whereby less serious offences are disposed of infor-
mally and expeditiously, and more serious offences prosecuted. Such
influences may have restrictive or liberational consequences,
depending on the model of criminal justice subscribed to.
Fionda relied on these influences to argue the legal principles
traditionally considered to limit prosecutorial discretion – ‘‘legality’’
and ‘‘expediency’’ – are inadequate for explaining and justifying
90 J. Fionda (above n 2) at 46.
91 Ibid at 172.
92 Ibid.
93 M. Joutsen, ‘‘Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study’’, (1997)
5(2) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 179.
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prosecutors’ modern involvement at sentencing. The former principle
connects to Packer’s ‘‘due process model’’ of criminal justice, which
restricts pre-trial prosecutorial discretion to protect defendants’ civil
liberties – where there is sufficient evidence of guilt, prosecution must
follow, with public interest criteria deemed largely irrelevant.94 The
latter connects to his ‘‘crime control model’’, which enables a high
degree of pre-trial dispositional discretion – guilt does not trigger
prosecution, which turns on where the public interest lies.
As most criminal justice systems feature aspects of both principles
– with the combination ‘‘determined by practical necessity, consti-
tutional rules, or political demands’’ – Fionda advanced three alter-
native criminal justice models to explain and justify modern
prosecutorial involvement in sentencing.95 The ‘‘operational effi-
ciency model’’ contends that prosecutors have a managerial role and
exercise sentencing powers to control an increasing workload.96
While Fionda argued that this model is met with ‘‘open indignation’’
in England, this is no longer the case given the Code’s formalisation
of Crown Prosecutors’ role in sentencing and the now-accepted
practice of sentence indications.97
Under the ‘‘restorative model’’ prosecutors use sentencing powers
to advance mediatory, reparative, compensatory, rehabilitative and
re-integrative goals to help restore the social balance disrupted by
offending and return victims and offenders to the status quo ante.98
Relying largely on data from the United States, Fionda argued that
European criminal justice systems and England needed to focus more
on the needs of victims. Here the position has also advanced.99 Vic-
tims are now guaranteed entitlements by the CPS under the Code of
Practice for Victims of Crime, which places victim personal state-
ments on a statutory footing and provides complaints mechanisms.100
94 H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1968).
95 J. Fionda (above n 2) at 9.
96 M. Joutsen (above n 93).
97 A. Sanders, ‘‘The Limits to Diversion from Prosecution’’, (1988) 28(4) British
Journal of Criminology 513.
98 M. Joutsen (above n 93).
99 A. Britton (above n 24).
100 Ministry Of Justice, Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (London: Ministry
of Justice, 2015).
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Lastly, the ‘‘credibility model’’ aims to restore public confidence in
the criminal justice system by informal intervention with low-level
offenders early on in the criminal justice process.101 Failure to do so
blurs social norms and suggests that certain types of offending are
tolerated.102 To counter this, prosecutors are conferred sentencing
powers to informally adjudicate guilt and sanction. Fionda argued
that it is similar to the ‘‘crime control model’’ but goes further to
address ‘‘the public image of the criminal justice system’’.103 Whilst it
derives from ‘‘populist punitiveness’’, it seeks to enhance public
confidence so greater use can be made of constructive sanctions.
As noted, Fionda’s study has been built on by more recent
empirical research.104 Findings suggest prosecutorial influence upon
procedural forms is increasing alongside an evolving adjudactory
role. This resonates strongly with Fionda’s ‘‘operational efficiency’’
and ‘‘credibility’’ models above. Indeed, Jehle and Wade note, ‘‘There
is almost no country in Europe which follows the principle of legality
without any exception’’105 – something which reflects in large part a
trend towards the diversion/decriminalisation of less serious cases.
Important also for present purposes is empirial research on ‘‘an-
choring effects’’. Generally, this research demonstrates a randomly-
chosen standard in a comparative judgment task may influence a
subsequent absolute judgment of the same target. Englich and col-
leagues have extended this research to sentencing, finding legal ex-
perts who take the role of a judge,106 and defence counsel,107 are
strongly influenced by a prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation108
in that they ‘‘anchor’’ their sentencing decisions on the recommen-
dation and assimilate them towards the recommendation, even when
101 M. Joutsen (above n 93).
102 J. Fionda (above n 2) at 189.
103 Ibid at 175.
104 M. Wade (above n 20) at 109–110.
105 Ibid at 24.
106 B. Englich and T. Mussweiler, ‘‘Sentencing under uncertainty: Anchoring ef-
fects in the court room, (2001) 31 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1535–1551.
107 B. Englich, T. Mussweiler and F. Strack, ‘‘The last word in court – A hidden
disadvantage for the defense, (2005) 29 Law and Human Behavior 705.
108 B. Englich, T. Mussweiler and F. Strack, ‘‘Playing Dice With Criminal Sen-
tences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making’’,
(2006) 32 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 188.
ANDREW BRITTON394
the recommendation came from an irrelvant source, they were in-
formed it was randomly determined, or they randomly determined it
themselves by rolling a dice.109 Expertise and experience do not re-
duce this effect110 and correlational evidence from court files suggests
the same pattern.111 One significant implication of these findings is
they suggest the practice whereby defendants are given ‘‘the last
word’’ in court may in fact disadvantage them, for it deprives them of
the opportunity to set the initial sentencing recommendation, and
thus to ‘‘anchor’’ the process.112
3.3 Relevance of Socio-Legal Theory on Discretion
The above discussion highlights the importance of how ‘‘sentencing’’
and ‘‘discretion’’ are conceived and how they impact the rationalising
of prosecutorial involvement. ‘‘Sentencing’’ is often described as the
judicial function performed after a conviction is entered. Padfield,
Morgan and Maguire refer to it as ‘‘the allocation of criminal sanc-
tions’’.113 Freiberg and Murray define it as ‘‘a dispositive order of a
criminal court consequent upon a finding of guilt’’.114 But such
descriptions say little about ‘‘the person or institution that is doing
the handing out’’.115 When sentencing is more broadly understood to
encompass a criminal justice actor’s ability to influence the penalty
imposed, it falls squarely within the remit of Crown Prosecutors.
Crown Prosecutors have both indirect and direct influence on sen-
tencing and its outcomes, with their discretion’s effect apparent from
early on in the criminal justice process.116 They indirectly impact out-
comes through the decision to prosecute, position on bail, charging
109 B. Englich, T. Mussweiler and F. Strack (above n 108) at 197.
110 Ibid.
111 Englich, T. Mussweiler and F. Strack (above n 107).
112 Ibid at 706.
113 N. Padfield, R. Morgan and M. Maguire, ‘‘Out of Court, Out of Sight?
Criminal Sanctions and Non-Judicial Decision-Making’’, in M. Maguire, R. Mor-
gan, and R. Reiner (eds), Oxford Handbook Of Criminology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 5th ed, 2012).
114 A. Freiberg and S. Murray, ‘‘Constitutional Perspectives on Sentencing: Some
Challenging Issues’’, in A. Freiberg and S. Murray (eds), Federal Crime and Sen-
tencing Conference, 11–12 February Canberra (Canberra: The National Judicial
College of Australia and the ANU College of Law, 2012) at 4.
115 A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 6th ed, 2015) at 10.
116 Ibid.
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choice, mode of trial, and evidence placed before the court.117 More
directly, they impact sentencing outcomes through their role in nego-
tiating charges, affording diversion from prosecution, amending fac-
tual summaries, and presenting information and submissions to the
court.118 Throughout they have penal aims in mind.119
This understanding of Crown Prosecutors’ sentencing function is
facilitated by the perspective of socio-legal theory. Whereas legal
theory tends to focus on the relationship of discretion to justice, law
and human rights, and seeks to develop strategies to keep discretion
at a minimum, socio-legal theory is concerned with identifying and
understanding the underlying sources of authority, the factors which
do or should determine decisions, and the processes and people that
are involved in them.120 It thus permits a more nuanced ‘‘naturalis-
tic’’ understanding of decision-making that remains ‘‘true to the
nature of the social world studied’’.121
The socio-legal perspective has generated important findings on
the concept of ‘‘discretion’’ generally. Crucially, it is shaped or con-
strained by informal rules, such as ‘‘process’’.122 Discretion is
observable in routine and repetitive decision-making at all levels123,
and it often occurs in parallel or series, with decisions made at one
level influencing those at another.124 ‘‘Process’’ also highlights dis-
cretion’s gate-keeping function, which is greatest when rules are
permissive or decision-making less visible.125 Previous research shows
that prosecutors commonly wield such powers under the auspices of
the ‘‘public interest’’.126
117 A. Ashworth (above n 83).
118 Ibid.
119 J. Rogers, ‘‘Restructuring the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in Eng-
land’’, (2006) 26(4) Oxford J. Legal Stud. 755.
120 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14).
121 K. Hawkins (above n 5) at 29.
122 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14).
123 K. Hawkins (above n 39).
124 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
125 M. Lipsky (above n 35).
126 See J. Baldwin and M. McConville, Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead
Guilty (London: Martinson, 1977); K. Hawkins, (above n 5); M. McConville, A.
Sanders and R. Leng, The Case for the Prosecution: Police Suspects and the Con-
struction of Criminality (London: Routledge, 1991); A. Sanders and R. Young,
‘‘From suspect to trial’’, in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford
Handbook of Criminology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2012).
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Other examples of informal rules include ‘‘social, political and
economic contexts’’.127 These were important in Fionda’s study.
While there is no consensus on their legitimacy as influences on
decision-making, a growing body of research discusses and explores
them.128 It shows how criminal justice actors – including Crown
Prosecutors129 – respond to and reflect modern societal pressures,
including: increased crime and insecurity in society;130 ‘‘populist’’
opinions;131 concern for victims’’ rights;132 and managerial priori-
ties.133
Organisational, occupational and situational factors are a further
informal influence on discretion. Different working groups have dif-
ferent philosophies that shape and constrain decisions. Prosecution
must be understood as ‘‘a product of organizational structures and
behavior’’.134 For Gelsthorpe and Padfield, the ‘‘key issue here is the
degree to which an organisation can control the behaviour of its
members.’’135 The socio-legal perspective thus enjoins us to explore
features, mechanisms and dynamics of prosecution organisations,
such as: recruitment and training; mentoring and supervision; per-
formance standards; and incentives and punishments.
Lastly, the socio-legal perspective shows how the ‘‘subjective’’
quality of discretion allows illicit or irrelevant considerations to enter
127 K. Bottomley, Decisions in the Penal Process (London: Martin Robinson,
1973); K. Hawkins (above n 5).
128 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14).
129 See J. Fionda (above n 2); B. Grosman, The Prosecutor (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1969); K. Hawkins (above n 5); McConville, A. Sanders and R. Leng
(above n 126); S. Moody and J. Tombs, Prosecution in the Public Interest (Edin-
burgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1982).
130 H. Boutellier, The Safety Utopia. Contemporary Discontent and Desire as to
Crime and Punishment (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004); D. Garland,
The Culture Of Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
131 A. Bottoms, ‘‘The Philosophy and Politics of Punishment and Sentencing’’, in
C. Clarkson and R. Morgan (eds) The Politics of Sentencing Reform (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995); J. Pratt, Penal Populism (Oxford: Routledge, 2007); J. Ro-
berts, et al, Penal Populism and Public Opinion: Lessons From Five Countries (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
132 A. Britton (above n 24).
133 M. Feeley and J. Simon, ‘‘The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy
of Corrections and its Implications’’, (1992) 30(4) Criminology 449.
134 K. Hawkins (above n 5) at 419.
135 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14) at 8.
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into decision-making.136 This often involves improper account being
taken of individual characteristics such as ethnicity, socio-economic
status, sex, and sexual orientation – which results in arbitrary or
discriminatory treatment, or the abuse of power.137 To guard against
such outcomes, and in the interests of control and accountability,
criminal justice actors are often prohibited from basing decisions on
such considerations by formal rules and policies, domestic and
international laws, and the existence of review mechanisms.138
Informal rules ultimately show the exercise of discretion has the
potential to be a negative or positive force, depending upon what
drives and channels it.139 It is the former and disadvantageous when
it makes it easier for decision-makers to act on the basis of improper
considerations, encourages mistakes, or allows the substitution of
personal standards for public or legal ones.140 In such situations,
discretion has adverse consequences for the common law values of
‘‘consistency, equality, and social justice’’.141
Conversely, discretion is a positive force and valuable when it
leads to justice.142 Its flexibility and ability to focus on the individual
case is key here. Discretion enables decisions to be ‘‘tailored to the
particular circumstance of each particular case’’.143 This enables
decision-makers to consider circumstances that ought to impact a
decision but which could not be foreseen by rules; to resolve conflict
in ways that accommodate multiple interests; to promote a rule’s
purpose; and to make more defensible decisions by developing
precedent and discouraging ‘‘overly bureaucratic’’ thinking.144
Particularly relevant for Crown Prosecutors is their ability to show
‘‘mercy’’ when acting in the public interest. Mercy is afforded when
decision-makers ‘‘have compassion…but cannot articulate a precise
136 K. Hawkins (above n 39).
137 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14).
138 K. Davis (above n 33).
139 N. Lacey, ‘‘Discretion and Due Process at the Post-Conviction Stage’’, in I.
Dennis (ed) Criminal Law and Justice: Essays From the W.G. Hart Workshop, 1986
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987).
140 C. Schneider (above n 37).
141 A. Ashworth (above n 115) at 19.
142 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14).
143 C. Schneider (above n 37) at 67.
144 Ibid at 61–67.
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justification’’.145 While expected in sentencing, it goes beyond the
expediency and leniency easily justifiable under the ‘‘just-deserts’’
view of sentencing.146 Bottoms suggests that provided the affording
of mercy is exceptional and rational, and done with a view towards
parity and legitimacy, it may be justifiable.147 This reflects the fact
that under the socio-legal perspective the fundamental concern with
any exercise of discretion is ‘‘justice-as-fairness’’.148 The unfair
exercise of discretion becomes an assertion of power and authority
that may undermine human rights,149 the rule of law,150 and the
criminal justice system’s very legitimacy.151 The opposite applies
when discretion is exercised in a fair manner.
IV METHODOLOGY
4.1 Approach
The methodology sought to establish an evidence base that would
allow Crown Prosecutors’ role in sentencing in New Zealand to be
described and interpreted, and the research questions addressed. My
goal was to obtain knowledge about individual Crown Prosecutors’
views on their regime; in particular, how they understand and per-
form their role in sentencing. I considered semi-structured interviews
were most suitable for this purpose due to their focus on obtaining
extensive detail and meaning from the lived experience and under-
standing of participants.152 The method was also able to be accom-
modated within the limited time and resources available, and it
attended to my preference for quality over quantity.
145 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14) at 6.
146 N. Walker, Aggravation, Mitigation and Mercy in English Criminal Justice
(London: Blackstone Press Ltd, 1999).
147 A. Bottoms, ‘‘Five Puzzles In Von Hirsch’s Theory Of Punishment’’, in A.
Ashworth and M. Wasik (eds) Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory , (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998) at 67–68.
148 L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (above n 14) at 14.
149 A. Ashworth (above n 115); J. Jackson, ‘‘The Adversary Trial and Trial by
Judge Alone’’, in M. McConville and G. Wilson (eds), The Handbook of the Criminal
Justice Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
150 T. Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Allen Lane, 2010).
151 T. Tyler (above n 13).
152 S. Kvale, InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing
(Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1996).
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Because many decisions of prosecutors are never recorded, or are
recorded in documents that are difficult to obtain, prosecutors’ ac-
counts are often the best source available.153 In New Zealand, the
Ministry of Justice keeps no records of the frequency with which
charges are amended prior to guilty pleas; or with which sentencing
judges adopt prosecution versus defence sentence recommendations,
or appease both sides. Accordingly, the interviews helped to get be-
hind Crown Prosecutors’ actions and gave them the chance to ‘‘ex-
plain their reasoning, and to elaborate on their efforts to live up to
rule-of-law ideals such as consistency and non-arbitrariness’’154 –
something which they do not ordinarily get the time or opportunity
to do.
In utilising semi-structured interviews, the methodology sub-
scribed to the view that knowledge is inter-relational and exists within
the relationship between a person and the world.155 A ‘‘construc-
tivist’’ approach to data generation, analysis and theory development
was adopted.156 This blended Glaser and Strauss’s ‘‘grounded the-
ory’’157 with Blaikie’s ‘‘abductive research strategy’’.158 The research
findings and explanations fashioned emerged from inductively using
Glaser and Strauss’s ‘‘constant comparative method’’159 with Blaik-
ie’s process of ‘‘moving between everyday concepts and meanings, lay
accounts and social explanations’’.160
There were notable departures from the original statement of
‘‘grounded theory’’. First, a literature review was conducted before
any fieldwork. This decision was made due to my concern to first
locate and describe the form of the Crown Prosecutor’s role in sen-
tencing in all three countries per law and policy documents. Secondly,
I decided to use Hawkins’ analytic framework of ‘‘surround’’, ‘‘field’’
153 R. Wright, K. Levine, and M. Miller. ‘‘The Many Faces of Prosecution’’,
(2014) 1 Stanford Journal of Criminal Law & Policy 27–47.
154 R. Wright, K. Levine, and M. Miller (above n 153) at 46.
155 S. Kvale (above n 152).
156 K. Charmaz, ‘‘Grounded theory: Objectivist and constructivist methods’’, in
N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds) Strategies of qualitative inquiry (London: Sage
Publications, 2003).
157 B. Glaser and A. Strauss, The discovery of grounded theory (Chicago: Aldine,
1967).
158 N. Blaikie, Designing Social Research (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).
159 B. Glaser and A. Strauss (above n 157).
160 J. Mason, Qualitative Researching (London: Sage Publications, 2002) at 180.
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and ‘‘frame’’ to help structure the process of data analysis.161 Because
abductive reasoning allows reference to broader concepts and per-
sonal experience,162 this framework acted as a ‘‘heuristic tool’’163 that
ensured key areas relevant to discretion were explored.
My background was relevant to the research process. As a
‘‘practitioner researcher’’,164 I had to acknowledge that: I was part of
the world studied; I had inside knowledge and experience; and this
shaped the research direction at each stage. My knowledge and
experience as a Crown Prosecutor informed the issues explored in the
semi-structured interviews and the type of questions asked. It also
reinforced the suitability of the constructivist approach adopted,
which ‘‘assumes the relativism of multiple social realities, recognizes
the mutual creation of knowledge by the viewer and viewed, and aims
toward an interpretive understanding of subjects’ meanings’’.165
With respect to researching prosecution, several advantages to the use
of a grounded approach have been identified. For instance, it is argued
that it is better able to integrate the insights of political science, sociology
and law about the variety of forces that shape prosecutors’ choices.166 It is
also contended to be more likely to lead to reform proposals that are
realistic to implement and generate buy-in from prosecutors.167 Further,
when many different prosecutors’ offices are reached, it is also suggested
that it is more likely to create theoretical synergy.168
4.2 Access and Sampling
Obtaining access to Crown Prosecutors in New Zealand proved fairly
straightforward due to my connection to the regime.169 New Zealand
is comprised of two main islands – the North and the South. Each
Crown Solicitor is appointed to a district in one of the islands. Each
district is usually in a High Court centre and the Crown Solicitor is
responsible for the conduct of ‘‘Crown’’ prosecutions (previously
161 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
162 J. Mason (above n 160).
163 A. Coffey and P. Atkinson, Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complementary
Research Strategies (London: Sage Publications: 1996) at 155–158.
164 J. Reed and S. Proctor (above n 20).
165 K. Charmaz (above n 156) at 250.
166 R. Wright, K. Levine, and M. Miller (above n 153).
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid at 28–29.
169 Detailed information on access and sampling can be obtained from the author.
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known as ‘‘indictable’’) in the High Court and District Court for that
district.170 With consent of the Deputy Solicitor-General, who has
delegated responsibility for the management of Crown Solicitors and
prosecutions, I approached Crown Solicitors situated across the
width and breadth of both islands to capture a mix of participants
from both ‘‘urban’’ and ‘‘provincial’’ offices.
Of the 17 districts, I defined five as ‘‘urban’’ because they are
located within large cities with sizeable staff. The remaining 12 dis-
tricts were defined as ‘‘provincial’’ because they are located within
smaller cities that service a surrounding rural area with fewer staff. In
total, I approached six urban and six provincial Crown Solicitors. A
specific request was made for a mix of Crown Prosecutors of ‘‘ju-
nior’’, ‘‘intermediate’’ and ‘‘senior’’ classifications – as determined by
the Deputy Solicitor-General. Previous research has shown that
prosecutors’ views change over their careers.171
A blend of respondent-driven and snowball sampling was thus
utilised to gain access to the sample.172 I received positive responses
from nine Crown Solicitors, of which four were urban and five were
provincial. A sample of ten participants was obtained (n = 10): two
urban at junior level; three urban at senior level; two provincial at
intermediate level; and three provincial at senior level. Six were fe-
male and four were male. Their career durations ranged from 10
months to 37 years, with an average of 11 years, 4 months. Of the
‘‘senior’’ Crown Prosecutors, some were Crown Solicitors.173 Al-
though the sampling strategy was opportunistic, it resulted in a di-
verse mix of participants.
4.3 Semi-structured Interviews
Face-to-face interviews have become a ‘‘gold standard’’ in terms of
validity and rigour.174 Due to my residence in Cambridge, England
170 Crown Law, Crown Solicitor Network (Wellington: Crown Law), at: http://
crownlaw.govt.nz/about-us/crown-solicitor-network/.
171 B. Grosman (above n 129).
172 See: D. Heckathorn, ‘‘Comment: Snowball Versus Respondent-Driven Sam-
pling’’ (2011) 41(1) Sociological Methodology 355–366; R. Bachman and R. Schutt,
The Practice of Research in Criminology and Criminal Justice (Thousand Oaks,
California: Sage Publications, 5th ed, 2014) at 467.
173 Their exact number and locations are not specified so as to ensure their
anonymity as far as possible.
174 H. Deakin and K. Wakefield, ‘‘Skype interviewing: reflections of two PhD
researchers’’, (2014) 14(5) Qualitative Research 603–616.
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and participants’ residence across New Zealand, and given the limited
time and resources available to the study, such interviews were not
possible. Instead, I decided to interview participants over the Internet
via the Skype software programme. Such technology has allowed
many problems associated with face-to-face interviews to be over-
come.175
The interviews were controlled by a semi-structured approach.176
Part one explored participants’ background and office environments.
They were asked to describe their tertiary training. Probes explored
where they had studied; what education they had received on prosecu-
tion and sentencing; and how adequate it was at preparing them for the
realities of practice. Participants discussed their career progression.
Probes explored how long they had performed their role and where;
their classification; and why they chose prosecution as a career. Dis-
cussion then shifted to participants’ work environment. Probes explored
how many staff worked in their office; their seniority; what systems
existed for mentoring, supervision and review; and what internal or
external training they had received, and its adequacy.
Part two focused first on participants’ roles generally, and then
specifically in relation to sentencing. Participants were asked to discuss
their understanding of the ethical positions required by their role. Next,
they were asked to describe the various interests or individuals they rep-
resent. Probes explored any difficulties they encountered in these areas.
Participants were then asked to describe their role and functions at sen-
tencing. Probes explored what submissions they made to the sentencing
judge (written and oral); what information was included in them; what (if
any) recommendations on sentenceweremade;what form these took; and
what impact they had on sentencing judges’ decisions.
Part three explored participants’ views and understanding of their
discretion, and perceived influences on it. To orientate discussion,
participants were given a classic definition of ‘‘discretion’’: ‘‘A public
officer has discretion whenever the effective limits of his [or her]
power leave him [or her] free to make a choice among possible
courses of action or inaction’’.177 Participants were asked whether
they agreed with this or would define it differently. Probes explored
how much discretion they felt they had in sentencing; what advan-
tages and disadvantages attached to it; and what things impacted
175 Ibid at 604.
176 J. Mason (above n 160). Detailed information on interview methodology can
be obtained from the author.
177 K. Davis (above n 33) at 4.
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upon its exercise. Before the interview concluded, participants were
asked how their role might be improved.
4.4 Research Ethics
The key ethical issues encountered related to confidentiality and
obtaining informed consent.178 The assurance of confidentiality and
anonymity was a key reason for participants’ agreement to be
interviewed. It was also necessary to ensure their sincere responses.
At each interview’s outset, these matters were stressed and partici-
pants were informed that any references to their name, sex, location,
or other identifying particulars would be neutralised. A code was
allocated to each participant’s interview recording and transcript –
these are used in the data analysis below. They reflect participants’
classifications and the type of office they worked within (Table 1).
4.5 Limitations and Strengths
Qualitative research centered on semi-structured interviews cannot
offer an entirely comprehensive portrait of New Zealand Crown
Prosecutors’ performance. Indeed, self-portrayal might not prove
accurate if the full statistical record were available for analysis.179 For
instance, individuals may be inclined to paint themselves in the best
light and congratulate their current self when talking to interview-
ers.180 This was apparent with some intermediate participants inter-
viewed. As Wright, Levine and Miller emphasize, ‘‘The best research
settings are those that allow researchers to confirm…claims about
performance with a statistical record of the performance.’’181
The small sample size and non-random approach to sampling also
means the conclusions drawn do not ‘‘represent’’ New Zealand
Crown Prosecutors’ views. While the transcripts were read in a sys-
tematical way as views were considered across topics – with partici-
pants sorted by office-type and classification – only impressions are
reported below and not numerical differences in opinion. However,
the paper’s findings do deepen understanding in important ways and
participants’ responses illustrate the range of views held.
178 Detailed information on ethical issues encountered can be obtained from the
author.
179 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
180 R. Wright, K. Levine, and M. Miller (above n 153).
181 Ibid at 45.
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4.6 Analytic Framework
The data analysis process ran through three phases, which were
staggered according to Hawkins’ analytic framework of ‘‘surround’’,
‘‘field’’ and ‘‘frame’’.182 Thematic codes were derived from the
interpretive reading of each transcript. The use of a constructivist
approach together with this ‘‘theoretical scaffold’’ helped focus the
analysis on those matters most salient to Crown Prosecutors’ exercise
of discretion in sentencing.183
The ‘‘surround’’ enjoined me to explore the social, political, and
economic environment in which the decision-making activities of
Crown Prosecutors and their offices occurred. Susceptible to change,
it is often the site of unexpected events, which may create expecta-
tions and impose demands on organisations and their staff.184 The
media are central to the ‘‘transmission and interpretation’’185 of such
events – something which has been well-documented in more recent
times.186 Organisations cannot control the surround but only react to
TABLE 1
Sample composition
n = 10 Office-type Classification Code
1 Urban Junior UJ1
2 Urban Junior UJ2
3 Provincial Intermediate PI1
4 Provincial Intermediate PI2
5 Provincial Senior PS1
6 Provincial Senior PS2
7 Provincial Senior PS3
8 Urban Senior US1
9 Urban Senior US2
10 Urban Senior US3
182 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
183 K. Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through
Qualitative Analysis (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2006); R. King
and E. Wincup, Doing Research on Crime and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2nd ed, 2008).
184 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
185 Ibid at 49.
186 D. Green, When Children Kill Children (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008); J. Pratt (above n 131).
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it through gradual shifts in policy or immediate changes in prac-
tice.187
The ‘‘field’’ is the immediate setting of a decision, both its
‘‘background’’ and ‘‘foreground’’.188 It is ‘‘the seen-as-relevant-at-
the-moment assemblage of facts and meanings within which a deci-
sion is located’’,189 and is susceptible to change in the surround.190
Importantly, it enjoined me to explore the ideas that participants and
their offices subscribed to and employed. This required analysis of the
interplay between the formal rules that governed decision-making
and the informal expectations, notions, and aims of staff at different
levels.191 The influence of hierarchies, relationships, and resourcing
were relevant.
The decision-making ‘‘frame’’ speaks rather to the interpretive
behaviour involved in decision-making. It describes ‘‘how features in
a particular problem or case are understood, placed, and accorded
relevance’’ and it represents a ‘‘structure of knowledge, experience,
values, and meanings’’192 that shape decision-making. Here, my
commitment to naturalism and a holistic view of decision-making
was important. I had to appreciate that frames are subjective and the
surround, field and frame are in constant ‘‘mutual interaction’’ and
subject to negotiation. Frames are the ‘‘conventional units by which
the legal system knows its raw material.’’193
Given the above, the data analysis identified themes first in the
‘‘surround’’, secondly in the ‘‘field’’, and thirdly in respect of
apparent ‘‘frames’’. Analysis then moved on to identify patterns,
convergences and divergences across the interviews. The process
progressed in this way through initial coding, revision and refine-
ment, upwards towards explanatory categories.194 Only those themes
that emerged in notable ways are discussed in following chapters.
187 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
188 Ibid.
189 P. Manning, ‘‘Big Bang’ Decisions: Notes on a Naturalistic Approach’’, in K.
Hawkins (ed) The Uses of Discretion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 261.
190 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid at 52.
193 Ibid at 53.




The data analysis first identified themes in the ‘‘surround’’. In the
interviews, participants discussed the pressures that influenced their
discretion in sentencing. Themes emerged related to political, eco-
nomic and social forces impacting the Network, notably: its over-
burdened and under-resourced state; demands to be efficient, cost-
effective, and receptive to public concerns; the increased complexity
of sentencing; and the increased disposal of less serious offences.
Ultimately, these were categorised into ‘‘managerial’’, ‘‘populist’’,
and ‘‘victim’’ pressures, which exerted influence in and between of-
fices, and impacted stakeholder interactions. Similarities to Fionda’s
assessment of ‘‘background factors’’ were apparent.
5.1.1 Managerial Pressures
Modern criminal justice is preoccupied with managerial concerns for
efficient, effective, and economic systems.195 Discretionary sentencing
practices – like ‘‘plea-bargaining’’ – are often located ‘‘upstream’’ of
judicial control to advance these concerns, justified by the fact that
‘‘indelible criminalization’’ is criminogenic and expensive.196 Pulling
in the opposite direction is previous research that has shown such
practices may produce discriminatory, inconsistent, and unfair sen-
tencing outcomes, particularly if accompanied by poor guidance,
lower standards of proof, or inadequate quality assurance, trans-
parency and accountability.197
The interviews suggested the potential for unjust sentencing out-
comes has increased in New Zealand. Participants discussed two
195 M. Feeley and J. Simon (above n 133); L. Zedner ‘‘Policing Before and After
the Police’’, (2006) 1 British Journal of Criminology 78–96.
196 N. Padfield, R. Morgan and M. Maguire (above n 113) at 964.
197 N. Padfield, R. Morgan and M. Maguire (above n 113); A. Sanders and R.
Young (above n 126). See D. Cook, Rich Law, Poor Law: Different responses to tax
and supplementary benefit fraud (Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 1989); Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the
Crown Prosecution Service, Exercising Discretion: The Gateway To Criminal Justice.
London: Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, (London: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
the Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Crown Prosecution Service,
2011); V. Kemp and L. Gelsthorpe, ‘‘Youth justice: discretion in pre-court decision-
making’’, in L. Gelsthorpe and N. Padfield (eds) Exercising Discretion (Cullmpton:
Willan Publishing, 2003); M. McConville, A. Sanders and R. Leng (above n 126).
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parallel changes in the surround which relate to how prosecutions are
processed and funded. The first concerned an overhaul of criminal
procedure in July 2013, when the Criminal Procedure Act 2011
(‘‘CPA’’) was implemented. This sought to create efficiencies in, and
reduce the overall cost of, criminal justice. The second concerned a
shift of the Network funding model from an invoice-based one
(whereby Crown Solicitors were paid for the time incurred on cases)
to a capped, bulk-funded one (whereby they are paid in instalments
connected to the volumes and types of cases disposed of).198 These
changes’ interaction appears problematic.
For most participants, the CPA framed daily operations with a
sense of frustration. This arose from new procedural requirements,
like the mandatory referral of sentencing matters to restorative justice
conferences. US1 remarked, ‘‘everyone’s annoyed about it because its
clogging up the system and slowing down the process.’’199 Frustra-
tion also arose from the CPA’s perceived failure to achieve its object.
US3 opined, ‘‘I don’t think it has really assisted…You still get plenty
of defendants pleading guilty on the morning of trial.’’ This caused
participants to blame other stakeholders. US2 explained, ‘‘We have
one [defence] chambers…who have all the murders that are within
the office and we have not disposed of a single murder this financial
year because they just keep dragging them out.’’
The new funding model elevated frustration and generated con-
cern. By 2013, there was a 25 per cent reduction in fees paid to the
Network.200 This triggered structural changes to offices. PI2 sum-
marised, ‘‘People have left. Firms have split up. The criminal pros-
ecution side of things just isn’t worth as much as it used to be. Cold
198 Crown Law, Crown Law Four Year Plan (Wellington: Crown Law, 2016);
Crown Law, Crown Solicitor Terms of Office (Wellington: Crown Law, 2013); Crown
Law, Review of Public Prosecution Services (Wellington: Crown Law, 2011). A case is
‘‘disposed’’ of when it exits the criminal justice system either by the entering of
conviction and sentence on the charge(s), or by withdrawal/dismissal of the char-
ge(s). See Ministry of Justice, Justice Sector Forecast: Crown Law Forecast 2015–
2019 (Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2015).
199 The number of cases referred for a restorative justice assessment has tripled
since 2014. See A. Adams, ‘‘$16.2 million boost for restorative justice’’ (29 June
2016) (Wellington: New Zealand Government, at: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/re
lease/162m-boost-restorative-justice.
200 Crown Law, Crown Law Four Year Plan (above n 201). The 2016 Budget has
provided for NZ$19.7 million of new operating funding over the next four years. See
C. Finlayson, ‘‘Extra $19.7m for Crown prosecutions’’ (26 May 2016 ) (Wellington:
New Zealand Government), at: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/extra-197m-
crown-prosecutions.
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commercial reality has to come to the fore at some point.’’ For PS2,
‘‘the focus has become quite insular.’’ Change played out in a public
way in Auckland (formerly the largest and most valuable Warrant),
which was divided in two.201 There was concern for the Network’s
ability to attract and retain quality staff, and for decision-making.202
US1 admitted, ‘‘we’re probably going to end up with a situation with
a whole lot of younger under-trained staff and we expect that there’ll
be a big fuck up.’’
Participants who became senior after the shift tended to believe
the new funding model was warranted. This reflected their greater
acceptance of the managerial surround. US2 observed, ‘‘there was so
much fat in the system.’’ US3 reflected that it was ‘‘probably abused
to some extent. As one lawyer once told me, ‘‘The Warrant is a
licence to print money’’ and I think in its hay-day it probably really
was. I think I’m glad that those days have gone.’’ Participants who
were senior prior to the shift held more rose-tinted, defensive of views
of the previous funding model. Some offices had struggled to adjust.
US1 noted, ‘‘in other firms, equity partners have made decisions that
they’re not going to take a pay cut. They’ll just live with…having less
staff.’’
A procedural change enacted by the CPA and its interaction with
the new funding model appears to have increased the potential for
unjust sentencing outcomes. For the first time, the CPA permits and
requires Crown Prosecutors to approach defence counsel before trial
with a view to resolving prosecutions. Previously, the convention was
the other way around. The new dynamic was summarised:
Prior…we didn’t really engage in deals or horse-trading, or instigate it…We
would always wait for defence counsel to come to us, and say If he pleads to
this, can we get movement on that?’ or Can we change this in the Summary of
Facts?’…Now there’s nothing stopping us from starting those discussions, and
sometimes I do.
(PI2)
201 H. Fletcher, ‘‘Auckland’s big battle of the barristers’’, in New Zealand Herald
(27 March 2015) (Auckland: New Zealand Herald, at: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/
business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11423563. A Warrant is a Crown
licence/contract to prosecute serious crime within a defined region and to invoice the
Crown for doing so. It is awarded by the Governor-General to a private-sector legal
practitioner and is held by that person until he/she relinquishes it.
202 S. Cowlishaw, S. Boyer and I. Steward, ‘‘Fears for justice after cost-cutting’’, in
The Dominion Post (11 July 2013) (Wellington: The Dominon Post), at: http://www.
stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/8903457/Fears-for-justice-after-cost-cutting.
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While ‘‘plea-bargaining’’ is disclaimed as a feature of New Zealand’s
criminal justice system,203 ‘‘plea discussions’’ have long been an ac-
cepted practice.204 Their distinguishing factor is the prohibition on
Crown Prosecutors agreeing to a sentence, which preserves judicial
oversight.205 Previous research in England, however, has shown the
falsity of this distinction.206
Given the new funding model, participants raised and discussed
whether the requirement to be proactive in resolving prosecutions was
effectively incentivising a form of ‘‘plea-bargaining’’. One commented:
There is a considerable amount of plea-bargaining and pragmatism…I suppose
the question that arises and where criticism comes in is are we bending over
backwards? Are we going too far to get rid of cases on the basis that its easier,
or whatever?
(PS3)
Suspicions were fuelled by the Auckland office’s creation of an ‘‘Early
Resolution Team’’ to identify and advance resolutions. PI2 opined,
‘‘you do hear stories around the traps about some jurisdictions just
resolving like a hell of a lot of cases to the point that, you’re like,
How can they do that many resolutions without compromising
something?’’ Although the media, politicians, and stakeholders have
drawn attention to the issue,207 barriers to transparency exist with the
203 C. Finlayson, Statement on Moko case (27 June 2016 ) (Wellington: New Zealand
Government), at: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/statement-moko-case.
204 Crown Law (above n 40) at 19–20; Crown Law, Prosecution Guidelines
(Wellington: Crown Law, 2010) at 21–22; Crown Law, Prosecution Guidelines
(Wellington: Crown Law, 1992) at para 7.1–7.6.
205 Crown Law (above n 40) at 19–20.
206 A. Ashworth (above n 48); A. Ashworth, and M. Blake,‘‘ Some ethical issues in
prosecuting and defending criminal cases’’, (1998) Criminal Law Review 16–34; J.
Baldwin and M. McConville (above n 119); K. Bottomley (above n 127); A. Bottoms
and J. McLean, Defendants in the Criminal Process (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1976); P. Darbyshire, ‘‘The mischief of plea bargaining and sentencing re-
wards’’, (2000) Criminal Law Review 895–910; S. Dell, Silent in court: the legal
representation of women who went to prison (London: Social Administration Research
Trust, 1971); S. McCabe and R. Purves, Bypassing the Jury (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1972).
207 S. Cowlishaw, S. Boyer and I. Steward (above n 202); A. Maas, ‘‘The real cost
of cut-price justice’’, in New Zealand Herald (18 May 2014) (Auckland: New Zealand
Herald), at: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=
11256874; A. Vance, ‘‘Labour concerned funding cuts leading to plea bargains’’, in
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information required to corroborate concerns inaccessible or
unavailable.
The interviews, therefore, provided an important insight into this
issue. Senior participants, in particular, suggested that a form of
‘‘plea-bargaining’’ is on the rise. US1 opined, ‘‘I certainly do believe
that we will be accepting pleas to lesser charges on less principled
bases than we did in the past, to dispose of cases. There’s huge
pressure on the system.’’ PS1 remarked, ‘‘There is definitely variation
in how people are charged between different Crown firms’’ and:
I think it has an influence on daily operations because everyone is so, What’s
happening in this Warrant? What are they doing? How’re they doing that?
How’re they getting that disposed of so quickly?’ …There’s a lot of suggestions
that some people are doing unprincipled resolutions…to get things disposed of
quicker so that they can get more money.
(PS1)
Unsurprisingly, no participants admitted that such behaviour oc-
curred in their offices; resolutions were done on a ‘‘principled basis’’
and within a ‘‘limit’’. For US2, the change was that, ‘‘under the old
system you weren’t as focused on looking at whether it was sensible
to carry on with the current charges or whether you should review it
under the Guidelines. Everyone just boxed on.’’
Ultimately, participants’ assertions as to the efficacy of their con-
duct are insufficient evidence of it. Previous research has shown that
decision-making differs between individuals, offices, regions, and
according to offence-type.208 The appropriateness of any resolution
will inevitably turn on individual judgment. PS1 explained, ‘‘whether
we charge someone with this charge or whether we think that’s a better
charge…Every has to a certain extent a personal view of it.’’ US2’s
observation that ‘‘different Crowns have worked differently, max-
imising what they receive out of the system’’ was thus unsurprising.
PS3 noted, ‘‘We get a lot of really small rubbishy cases…Wedon’t want
a jury sitting listening to a 5-minute domestic dispute for two days.’’
Bifurcation was undoubtedly influential in certain decisions resolve.
Footnote 207 continued
TVNZ (26 June 2016) (Auckland: TVNZ), at: https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/
new-zealand/labour-concerned-funding-cuts-leading-plea-bargains.
208 K. Hawkins (above n 5); Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary and
Her Majesty’s Inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service (above n 197); V. Kemp
and L. Gelsthorpe (above n 197); A. Sanders and R. Young (above n 126).
PRESSING FOR SENTENCE 411
5.1.2 Populist Pressures
Shifts in the characteristics of modern society, due to dynamics like
managerialism, have also altered the nature and experience of crime
and punishment.209 Penal practices and policies have become more
expressive, punitive, and populist. While in the early 20th century,
public opinion was regarded as something to be ‘‘managed’’,210 recent
politicisation of penal debates has seen it afforded greater deference
within public policy.211 While public involvement is important for
‘‘democratic principle’’,212 it has drawbacks with public opinion
proven flawed in key respects and susceptible to influence.213
The interviews suggested that participants’ role in sentencing is
influenced by public opinion, and that this may have a transformative
effect on decision-making. Frustration featured again in relation to:
the public’s poor understanding of participants’ role; extra-estab-
lishment, populist pressure groups’ influence; and participants’
inability to make corrective comment in the media. Ultimately, par-
ticipants’ views reflected how: victims play a key role in representing
and reaffirming moral values;214 the public is less prepared to leave
penal questions to experts;215 and the media plays an important role
in these dynamics.216
Previous research has shown the public is poorly or wrongly in-
formed about criminal justice issues. Crime and re-offending rates are
perceived to be increasing despite having declined from the early
1990s; the system is perceived to unduly favour offenders despite
continued bolstering of victims’ rights; and sentencing is perceived to
209 For a detailed review, see T. Daems, Making Sense of Penal Change (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2008).
210 M. Hough and J. Roberts, ‘‘Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice’’, in
M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook on Criminology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2012).
211 D. Green (above n 186); J. Pratt (above n 131).
212 D. Yankleovich, Coming to Public Judgment: Making Democracy Work in a
Complex World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991).
213 M. Hough and J. Roberts (above n 210).
214 H. Boutellier (above n 130); J. Pratt, ‘‘Elias, punishment, and decivilization’’,
in J. Pratt, et al (eds) The New Punitiveness. Trends, Theories, Perspectives (Cul-
lompton: Willan, 2005).
215 J. Pratt (above n 131); J. Roberts, et al. (above n 131).
216 D. Green (above n 193).
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be unduly lenient despite increasing tariffs.217 For participants, such
flawed understanding extended also to their sentencing role. For PS1,
‘‘one of the biggest stresses or concerns that I have is there’s a real
tension…in understanding our role.’’ US3 believed, ‘‘The public are
so ill-educated about the sentencing process, and the debate that goes
on…is non-existent.’’
Partly responsible for this is the public’s lack of familiarity and
engagement with the criminal justice system.218 One participant ex-
plained:
…there’s a perception from the public that the Court process is still slightly
secretive. Sentencing, discharge without conviction, name suppression. It’s
almost like it’s a kind of unknown entity…The public aren’t part of it…unless
they choose to go along.
(US3)
Also influential is misinformation. Most public knowledge is gained
through high profile or sensational media reports, which are often
vague or inaccurate.219 PS3 noted, ‘‘its very easy…to just get an
excerpt, which might be more of a headline than anything else, where
you can be mislead.’’ US3 remarked, ‘‘It’s not reported in an in-
formed way…Any media attention is…dominated by organisations
with a right wing agenda.’’
Participants noted here the particular influence of the Sensible
Sentencing Trust (‘‘SST’’), which claims to represent, and act on
behalf of, ‘‘victims of serious violent and/or sexual crime and homi-
cide’’.220 PS2 remarked, ‘‘They don’t get what they want; they then
wax on about the prosecutor not applying for this or…not applying
for that.’’ For US3, they ‘‘perpetuate myths for victims.’’ Partici-
pants, however, were mixed on whether public opinion and pressure
217 J. Gray, ‘‘What shapes public opinion of the criminal justice system’’, in J.
Wood and T. Gannon (eds) Public Opinion and Criminal Justice (Cullompton:
Willan, 2009); J. Roberts, et al. (above n 131).
218 B. Chapman, C. Mirilees-Black and C. Brawn, Improving Public Attitudes to
the Criminal Justice System: The Impact of Information, Home Office Research Re-
port 245 (London: Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate,
2002); C. Mirilees-Black, Confidence in the Criminal Justice System: Findings from the
2000 British Crime Survey, Research Findings 137 (London: Home Office Research
and Statistics Directorate, 2001).
219 J. Gray (above n 217).
220 SST, About us (Napier: Sensible Sentencing Trust), at: http://sst.org.nz/about-
us/.
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groups changed their decision-making in sentencing. For some, there
was a clear disconnect due to their independence and practiced
objectivity. PS2 explained, ‘‘it gets oxygen and it can be frustrating,
but its noise only. It doesn’t affect judgment.’’
For other participants, the influence of public opinion and pres-
sure groups was marked. UJ2 commented, ‘‘you feel a practical sense
of a pressure to seek a fair outcome but also you’re mindful of
community standards…and how seriously the community views
certain types of offending.’’ Further:
Old Garth McVicar will focus you if you don’t focus yourself. There’s so much
arse covering in this job isn’t there? You’re always mindful of ensuring those
really violent offenders or sexual offenders are in prison for as long as they
should be when there’s real risk.221
(US2)
Commenting on accountability, US2 explained, ‘‘It’s a horrible
byproduct really. It’s sort of always hanging there. You know that if
you do make a decision that can be perceived as wrong by the public,
you’ll be named and shamed.’’
This last point proved significant in the decision-making field.
During the interview period, a Crown Solicitor accepted guilty pleas
to a manslaughter charge – reduced from murder – for the unlawful
killing of a three year-old, Moko, who suffered extreme and pro-
longed abuse from two caregivers. This resolution caused shock and
outrage in the media222 and led to a SST protest and law-change
petition to abolish the practice of ‘‘plea discussions’’.223 The SST
blamed the new funding model:
Under changes introduced by the government three years ago, Crown lawyers
are now permitted – in fact incentivized – to sell victims short and enter into
221 Garth McVicar is the founder of the SST.
222 See D. Garner, ‘‘A little boy is dead – now who will march for Moko?’’, in
Stuff. (9 May 2016 ) (Wellington: Fairfax Media), at: http://www.stuff.co.nz/na
tional/crime/79646276/duncan-garner-a-little-boy-is-dead–now-who-will-march-for-
moko.
223 SST, ‘‘Moko: Protest at every Court in tribute to Moko’’, in Scoop (9 May
2016) (Wellington: Scoop Media), at: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1605/
S00110/moko-protest-at-every-court-in-tribute-to-moko.htm; SST, ‘‘Jus




sleazy deals which enrich them, and make a mockery of our justice system, and
the rights of victims.
(SST, 2016c)
Participants used this case to highlight the lack of public under-
standing of their role when evidential circumstances are complex and
the frustration it caused them in sentencing:
When you look at something and think, That’s been downgraded, there must
have been a deal done, and they must just want to get rid of it’, the reality is
that everybody is over the moon – the Police and we – to get a conviction of
some kind in the case, because the chances of succeeding are so slim. At least
we’ve got a bird in the hand.
(PS3)
As PS2 explained, ‘‘The reality is that you don’t get to plead a case
down from murder to manslaughter without Solicitor-General ap-
proval.’’
Frustration connected also to the fact that participants do not
ordinarily comment to the media. The Media Protocol for Prosecutors
constrains comment to particular circumstances, with primacy af-
forded to defendants’ fair trial right and any pending exercise of
judicial discretion.224 By convention, comment is reserved until after
a prosecution has been disposed of.225 Some participants supported
this for situations like the Moko case:
We’re very constrained obviously in what we can say. In fact, we say nothing.
At least that’s my policy…Because our role is neutral in the sense that we’ve
got to be fair in the way that we impart justice. So, us wading into the arena…I
mean that’s ridiculous really isn’t it?
(PS2)
224 See Crown Law, Media Protocol for Prosecutors (Wellington: Crown Law,
2013).
225 This happened in the Moko case, with the Attorney-General explaining the
resolution decision-making process and respective roles in a press release after sen-
tencing. See C. Finlayson, Statement on Moko case (27 June 2016) (Wellington: New
Zealand Government), at: https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/statement-moko-case
. The New Zealand Parliament’s Justice Committee subsequently released its report
on the SST’s petition requesting a ban on plea bargaining, concluding it would be
‘‘extraordinary intervention in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion’’. See NZ
House of Representatives Justice Committee, Petition 2014/91 of Garth McVicar on
behalf of the Sensible Sentencing Trust (December 2017) (Wellington: New Zealand
Government), at: https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/SCR_76192/817b1a54
9eb62c0c2b9aa55a44d52fc8289b61ee.
PRESSING FOR SENTENCE 415
For others, the strain caused by populist opinion led to a belief that
there should be a departure from the convention and forthright
comment made:
What I have found incredibly frustrating…is Crown Law and/or Crown
Solicitors as a whole…there’s this kind of We’re not going to comment’ and
that’s all very well but when there’s this national fury going on, actually,
sometimes…the Crown should comment and justify the decisions that are
made because then the misinformation discontinues.
(PS1)
Such participants also disclosed how the strain had led them to em-
ploy entrepreneurial solutions, like involvement with political parties
and courting of media. US3 remarked, ‘‘We’ve got a trusted rela-
tionship with them and that’s been developed over time. Typically,
they’re journalists who will take the time to at least understand the
case and then report accurately on it.’’
5.1.3 Victim Pressures
The victims’ rights movement changed sentencing practices across the
common law world, notably through expressive tools like victim
impact or victim personal statements.226 Accommodating such rights
in sentencing within the managerial surround generated acute pres-
sure for some participants:
…one of the tensions that we always have now is victim impact statements
because they’re quite prescribed about what they can and can’t say. The reality
for most victims is that those prescriptions are very hard for them to comply
with. They want to say what they want to say…
(PS1)
Poor public understanding of participants’ role was again perceived
as responsible:
…there is a real lack of understanding by not only some victims but organi-
sations, such as Victims’ Support, who are in the court, the Police sometimes,
about what our relationship should be with victims…there’s been an increase
in the expectation of what prosecutors will do for victims.
(US3)
Entrepreneurial solutions were also apparent here. For example,
some participants ignored their legal obligations to edit-out inad-
226 For discussion and the New Zealand regime, see A. Britton (above n 24).
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missible content from victim impact statements, occasionally as a
policy within their office:
…unless they’re really bad, like I fuckin’ hate him. I want him killed. I want
him to be dead’… we tend to just put it in and with a cover letter and say, We
appreciate this doesn’t comply but we won’t be relying on this but this is what
the victim wanted to say’.
(PS1)
Such non-compliance is problematic as, in a serial way, it may ad-
versely frame decision-making for downstream actors, like the sen-
tencing judge, prejudicing him or her against the offender, and
ultimately leading to an unjust sentencing outcome.
Other participants diligently complied with their obligations in
relation to victim impact statements. Reasons for such differences in
approaches were suggested. US3 speculated, ‘‘Maybe it’s a genera-
tional thing. I’ve seen it in a lot of older prosecutors…not wanting to
meet with the victims’ families and being really resistant to it.’’
Further:
The difference you can make by just including the victims in the process, just in
terms of their acceptance of what the sentence is or maybe to a change of
charge…if you’ve ever had a dissatisfied complainant…when the jobs done
there’s no fixing it.
(US3)
Similarly, US1 stated, ‘‘sometimes I think a lot of prosecutors don’t
really understand their role, and so therefore can’t explain adequately
to the victim what’s actually happening.’’ Such remarks showed that
participants’ attitudes and learnt operational philosophies were
inextricably intertwined.
5.2 The Field
The second stage of data analysis explored themes in the decision-
making ‘‘field’’. In the interviews, participants discussed their deci-
sion-making processes and interactions with stakeholders in sen-
tencing. Themes emerged consistent with Hawkins’ study:227
participants understood formal rules in occupational terms; decision-
making had a ‘‘typified’’ character; and justice was negotiated. No-
tably, participants’ discretion was influenced by: formal rules,
227 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
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including law and organisational policy; the creation of informal
rules, particularly office policy; office-types and hierarchies; and
stakeholder interactions. The surround’s intrusion on the field also
suggested that Fionda’s ‘‘operational-efficiency’’ and ‘‘credibility’’
models228 feature prominently in New Zealand.
5.2.1 Occupational Understanding
Prosecutorial decision-making is an organisational activity. Formal
and informal rules determine its contours and reach.229 The inter-
views showed that participants’ understanding of their mandate and
role in sentencing was appreciably derived from formal rules, par-
ticularly law and organisational policy. Participants routinely re-
ferred to the Guidelines, court Practice Notes, sentencing legislation,
and case law. Collectively, such matters establish an assistance role
for Crown Prosecutors and delineate the appropriate content and
structure of their written and oral submissions. Crucially, however,
participants’ responses revealed they afforded variable status to these
rules within their daily operations.
Some participants regarded the formal rules as prescriptive and
mandatory in nature. Discussing the Guidelines, US2 remarked,
‘‘Everyone’s issued with it – they’re working manuals for us.’’ Most
participants’ responses, however, instead suggested the rules were
‘‘desirable standards around which are zones of tolerance’’ for deci-
sion-making.230 PS1 stated, ‘‘We have a framework that we have to
operate in. We know where the lines are. Sometimes exercising dis-
cretion around the lines can be a bit blurred.’’ Likewise, PI2 admit-
ted, ‘‘We don’t have daily recourse to them but every now and then
we flick back to them, just to remind ourselves of…the various
principles.’’ To a degree, the formal rules were also taken-for-gran-
ted. PI1 remarked, ‘‘most of the principles contained are quite logical
and conform with the beliefs I hold…They kind of assume a certain
level of understanding and…competence, which you’d hope most
prosecutors have.’’
Such comments show how participants’ understood and actioned
their role in the field through an occupational frame. This was also
reflected in their views on the best sources of prosecutorial education.
Vocational learning imparted unique skills and insight not otherwise
obtainable. PS2 explained, ‘‘the real nitty gritty of what it is to be a
228 J. Fionda (above n 2).
229 Ibid at 427.
230 K. Hawkins (above n 5) at 427.
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prosecutor – there’s just nothing that covers off those issues. It really
has to be in-house to get that focus; to make it meaningful.’’ Ethical
prosecuting was associated with experience rather than deep under-
standing or diligent application of the formal rules. US2 remarked,
‘‘the more intuitive stuff, I don’t think you can teach that. Being a
responsible prosecutor… that sort of knowledge, just comes from
experience.’’
Participants’ occupational understanding of their role was also re-
flected in informal rules, particularly office policy. Previous research has
shown that policy at the centre of an organisation differs from policy at
the periphery, where decisions are made ‘‘according to conventions and
within background assumptions of a routine character’’.231 At office-
level, value-laden rules are perceived as remote from decision-making,
which responds to real world demands.232 This dynamic resonated
throughout the interviews. In particular, the managerial and populist
surround’s intrusion on the field spawned office policy on sentencing in
areas for which the formal rules offered no guidance.
The creation of office policy in such areas was necessary to
assimilate the pressures exerted on participants’ daily operations.
They discussed: increased work flows, obligations to victims, and
media attention on proceedings and sentencing outcomes; decreased
preparation time and funding; and more complex sentencing laws,
judges with variable competence, and information required. PS2
summed up these changes’ impact and extent, ‘‘When I first started
practice, sentencing memorandums were absolutely optional and
there were some prosecutors who wouldn’t even make any submis-
sions at sentencing.’’ For PS1, the changes meant, ‘‘we do the court’s
job for them.’’ Similarly, PS3 remarked, ‘‘They get it dished out to
them in some ways.’’
The creation of office policy was especially apparent in the area of
drafting written submissions. All participants’ offices made use of
individual precedent systems to improve efficiency, respond to
uncertainty, and instill confidence in decision-making. For example:
One of the areas…that is all over the show is burglary sentencing. The Court of
Appeal has always declined to do any guideline judgment on it. So…we did a
whole lot of research and came up with what we decided would be a guideline.
(US1)
231 K. Hawkins (above n 5) at 38.
232 P. Manning (above n 189).
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Staff in PS3’s office developed expertise: ‘‘A lot of these cases, of course,
we are turning out time and time again, and each of us tend to have an
area where we know what the penalties are.’’ PS2 noted the benefits:
‘‘Sentencing used to take a long period of time to prepare…but
with…your precedents, you’re basically just cutting out portions,
applying the facts, and coming up with a starting point or range.’’
The widespread use of precedents showed how the surround’s
intrusion on the field compelled participants to adopt ‘‘typification’’
strategies233 and a ‘‘downstream-orientation’’.234 This created con-
cerns for participants. Some questioned their relevance in sentencing:
…the offenders know what they’re going to get before they come to court; the
prosecutor knows what sentence is going to be imposed; the defence counsel
know.Whydon’t you just cut out themiddlemen,write out the decision, and sent
it with them to jail?
(PS2)
For others, consistency was an issue. US2 remarked: ‘‘I think its
perfectly possible in a busy firm like this for somebody to be working
in a way that isn’t consistent with what the partners would be
wanting.’’ For PS2, the lack of a common precedent system was an
issue: ‘‘I think that’s one of the disadvantages…we’re basically
recreating the wheel, each one of the Crown Solicitors.’’
The surround’s intrusion on the field also generated concern
around accountability. For some participants, this had a transfor-
mative effect on how they framed their assistance role in that it
heightened their sense of duty to prevent the court from falling into
‘‘appealable error’’:
One of my first senior lawyers actually said, It’s not about winning or losing.
It’s about whether or not your decision is going to be upheld on appeal.’ That’s
kind of more what it needs to be about I think – if someone in a higher court
looks down on what you had done…and thinks it was fair and just, and the
applicable law was applied, then great.
(PI2)
233 ‘‘Typification’’ is an ordering process in decision-making that enables decision-
makers to develop a stock of knowledge and anticipate others’ behaviour and out-
comes. See B. Frederick and D. Stemen (above n 1) at 5; K. Hawkins (above n 5) at
35–37.
234 B. Frederick and D. Stemen (above n 1).
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Adding context to this, US2 remarked: ‘‘we’re so bloody sat upon by
the Court of Appeal’’ and ‘‘in this environment, where there is so
little money now, it’s really in everybody’s interest to just to get back
in the box and be a bit more restrained.’’ Such comments exemplify
how the cost of being ‘‘wrong’’ was both reputational and fiscal.
5.2.2 Structural Influences
Instrumental purposes are not always shared by organisational ac-
tors.235 Previous research has shown that prosecutors’ views are
influenced by their location within an office and its ‘‘social architec-
ture’’.236 Senior prosecutors, in particular, are more refined in their
use of resources and moderate in perspective.237 This embodies
‘‘learning from past experience, developing a deeper appreciation for
the complexities of life, for the challenges of managing a caseload,
and for the infinite dimensions of human behaviour’’.238 The inter-
views similarly showed that seniority influenced participants’ deci-
sion-making in the field.
Most senior participants asserted they had become more balanced
and pragmatic over time.239 US3 reflected, ‘‘when you start…your
driver is really to try and respond to what’s happening in a legal
way…as time goes on and your judgment increases, and as your life
experience increases…your expectations get a bit lower, or you’re
more realistic.’’ Experience also influenced how such participants
framed risks and problems, and interpreted the public interest in
sentencing – particularly the type of cases perceived as meriting full
criminal justice treatment, as opposed to early resolution:
…with experience you see the disadvantages of sending somebody to jail who
has committed an offence that warrants imprisonment but who has had no
other exposure to those sorts of people inside jail, who are otherwise mean-
ingful contributors to society.
(PS2)
235 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
236 R. Wright, K. Levine, and M. Miller (above n 153).
237 B. Grosman (above n 122); R. Wright and K. Levine, ‘‘The Cure for Young
Prosecutors Syndrome’’, (2014) 56 Arizona Law Review 1066–1128.
238 R. Wright, K. Levine, and M. Miller (above n 153) at 43.
239 Only one senior participant claimed to have become more hard-edged over
time.
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Junior and intermediate participants, in contrast, were more
adversarial and less pragmatic in their views. Previous research has
shown that such prosecutors believe in the importance of each case,
adopt more aggressive postures with defence counsel, and seek out
experience.240 Consistent with this, PI2 remarked, ‘‘its an adversarial
system and defence are allowed to get away with a little bit more than
us…there is a natural tendency…to want to sort of go down to their
level at some point and scrap it out with them.’’ Likewise, on
ambitions, PI2 explained, ‘‘My goal has always been to sort of get as
many as cases I can under my belt as quickly as I can and to move up
the ranks to the senior position, and be doing the more high-profile
cases.’’
Office-type and structure also influenced on participants’ decision-
making in the field. Previous research has demonstrated how the
‘‘social architecture’’ of offices impacts on professional identity and
decision-making:241
When the chief prosecutor decides whom to hire, how much to pay them, how
to divide the work, how to train newcomers, how to monitor the work, and
how to respond when staff prosecutors exercise poor judgment, attorneys learn
from these choices what it means to be a good prosecutor.
Participants in larger urban offices experienced pyramidal office
hierarchies, often with specialised teams. Serial decision-making
dominated processes, notably the review of written submissions. US3
explained, ‘‘We’ve got quite a strict system. We have senior prose-
cutors who are called ‘‘Criminal Practice Managers’’… [junior pros-
ecutors’] work, and also the work of intermediate prosecutors, is
reviewed.’’ Such review systems served to constrain such participants’
perceived and actual discretion:
…if the senior prosecutor reviews my submissions and thinks I should be
submitting something different, I probably would submit something different. I
guess I am limited by being overruled by people who are more senior than me.
(UJ1)
240 R. Wright and K. Levine (above n 237).
241 K. Levine and R. Wright, ‘‘Prosecution in 3-D’’, (2013) 102(4) Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 1119–1180 at 1122.
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Participants in smaller provincial offices, in contrast, experienced
predominantly flat office shapes with general (or more diverse)
practices. Staff worked on an equivalent level with greater autonomy,
which resulted in less structured systems of review. Parallel or col-
lective decision-making was thus more common:
If there’s something unusual, we’ll toss it around…Somebody will come into
my room, then the others will turn up, we’ll have a general discussion about it,
and the person will go away quite happy that they’re on the right sort of level.
(PS3)
Whilst most provincial senior participants asserted that all written
submissions within their offices were reviewed, the managerial surround
and its high caseloads ultimately meant the quality of review varied:
…if it’s a really standard sentencing I’ll say, Look, I’ve got this…’ and [the
partner] won’t even look at the subs. He’ll just say, What’s your starting
point? What are the discounts?’ and we’ll just talk about it that way and file it.
(PI2)
5.2.3 Negotiated Justice
Relationships, how they are forged, and their stability frame decision-
making in the field.242 Indeed, previous research has shown how
prosecutors’ decisions may be the product of a ‘‘courtroom social
context’’.243 A community is formed between regular courtroom ac-
tors, defined by interdependent relationships and local legal culture.
It establishes values, norms and traditions that make decision-making
more predictable and efficient. These heighten prosecutors’ ‘‘down-
stream orientation’’ and enable them to anticipate and consider how
other stakeholders not yet involved in the process will respond.244
Participants’ familiarity with local sentencing judges influenced
their written and oral submissions’ content. The legislation included
was affected. PS1 remarked, ‘‘in the District Court, our judges have
said, We don’t want you to espouse the principles and purposes of
sentencing. That’s a complete waste of time’.’’ The case law included
was affected. PS2 explained, ‘‘We’ve got one resident judge who is a
242 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
243 See J. Baldwin and M. McConville (above n 126); B. Frederick and D. Stemen
(above n 1).
244 B. Frederick and D. Stemen (above n 1).
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stickler for the fact that, if there is a tariff judgment, you stick with
the tariff judgment.’’ The concessions nominated were also affected.
US3 noted, ‘‘some judges do expect us to state what reduction would
apply.’’ Such influence was most marked in provincial districts, where
there were fewer judges and thus tighter relationships.
Most problematically, participants’ familiarity with local judges
influenced their sentence recommendations. In the most explicit
example, PS2 explained:
We have now got to the stage where I have an understanding of what [the
judge’s] sentencing ranges are, and so I’m not pushing the barrow out. [The
judge] is always at the lower end of the available range…we’ve now got to a
mutual understanding is the answer.
(PS2)
In a similar vein, US2 remarked, ‘‘it never goes down well if you’re
beating your drum too hard…you’re going to get a lot further if you
don’t look like you’re really trying to hang them out to dry.’’ It thus
appeared that some participants altered what might otherwise have
been their recommendation so as to please judicial preference and
increase the likelihood of their submission’s adoption.
Such behaviour may help to explain why most participants re-
ported favourable judicial responses to their recommendations. Most
participants, however, considered such favourable responses reflected
their efforts in researching and drafting their written submissions. For
instance, PS3 remarked, ‘‘Ninety percent of the time, the judge will
take those figures because we are really, I think, diligent in getting
those figures reasonably right.’’ UJ1 noted, ‘‘I think they very rarely
pick a sentence start point that’s vastly different from what I’ve
said…because I pride myself on doing enough research to convince
them.’’ Similarly, PI1 stated, ‘‘I’d like to think that because I worked
for them for three years they trust that my research is sound.’’
Participants’ relationships with defence counsel also affected their
decision-making in the field, albeit variably. In some districts, par-
ticipants viewed defence counsel competency and interaction posi-
tively. PS3 remarked, ‘‘The process in my view really operates quite
well between defence counsel here…90% of the time, when we put
our submissions in…they’ll be within a few months of penalty.’’ Such
views led to parallel decision-making in response to incentives and
community pride. PS3 explained, ‘‘How they evaluate the courts is
based on how many days trials have been sitting in the system…Due
ANDREW BRITTON424
to defence counsel being cooperative…we’ve got the lowest de-
lays…So everybody has taken a bit of pride.’’
In other districts, participants’ views of defence counsel compe-
tency and interaction were instead marked by strain and frustration.
Typical of such views was the following response:
…we might have in our sentencing submissions seven, eight, nine pages’ worth
of submissions, and defence counsel will respond with a page or a page and a
half. Then, when it comes to the actual sentencing hearing itself…defence
counsel will go off script significantly…
(PS2)
Such perceived incompetency was often connected to the managerial
surround. PS1, for instance, noted, ‘‘the quality is decreasing and
that’s got a lot do with legal aid…there’s a real decrease in the
amount of opportunities for young lawyers to learn in a criminal
context.’’
Participants’ responses also showed the Police may influence
decision-making. Pressure was perceived as most felt by junior staff.
US2 explained, ‘‘I see that as a bit of a maturity thing…I think its
about managing [the Police] and about explaining to them early on
what your expectations are for sentence.’’ Typical of most views was
PI2’s remark, ‘‘they want to see good strong outcomes, and some-
times when they don’t get that, they can be a little miffed. But that’s
not a pressure.’’ Police incompetence did, however, affect victims. PI1
noted, ‘‘If it’s a case where CIB is involved, and you’ve got a very
competent office in charge, then victims have a lot more say in the
process.’’
Participants’ adherence to the principle of prosecutorial indepen-
dence was viewed as assimilating any pressure from Police or victims.
For PS2, victims created ‘‘a tension which is difficult to manage, but
we obviously have to work within our ethical obligations.’’ However,
victims’ presence in court did affect behaviour. US3 explained, ‘‘If a
victim is going to be present, the way I address or what I address the
judge on can be quite different from if a victim is not present.’’
Typically, this meant:
I would orally address portions of my submissions; usually go through the
aggravating and mitigating factors; discuss the starting point; and why I have
reached that conclusion. Sometimes you might spend same time discussing the
contents of the victim impact statement and the effects its had on the victim.
(PS1)
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There was variable understanding of the rationale for this difference
in allocution. More junior participants focused on imparting under-
standing to victims, whereas more senior participants focused on the
need for empathy and the alien nature of sentencing.
Participants behaved similarly in relation to high-profile cases or
when the media were present in court. The television media’s presence
had an appreciable impact on the behaviour. One senior participant
elaborated on such a sentencing:
I was incredibly emotional…and kind of choked up a bit…The sentencing
judge came to my rescue…I think there is something that changes for you as a
prosecutor if it’s a high profile case…you’re not doing anything differ-
ently…You’re just really conscious of it.
(US3)
The media also caused strain and frustration. US3 explained,
‘‘they turn up on day one of the trial and then disappear for the
rest…then they turn up at sentencing…They demand from you all
this information…I basically tell them to sort of get lost.’’ The
populist surround’s intrusion was evident here.
5.3 The Frame
The final stage of data analysis explored participants’ decision-
making ‘‘frames’’. In the interviews, participants discussed their:
background and training; office environment and leadership; and
understanding of discretion and their role. Themes emerged which
reflected how their decision-making frames were influenced by:
training and socialisation; disposition and conceptions of purpose;
and the subject matter of sentencing. Ultimately, such matters
determined whether participants pressed for a finite sentence or not.
Most participants abided by the Guidelines and recommended a
sentence range, although variation was admitted within offices.
5.3.1 Training and Socialisation
Frames are influenced by occupational and professional ideology,
which derives from socialisation and training.245 In New Zealand, no
specific tertiary or professional training is required to practice as a
Crown Prosecutor. Instead, Crown Prosecutors are typically re-
245 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
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cruited early in their careers and learn on the job.246 Previous re-
search has suggested that this impacts adversely on how such pros-
ecutors conceive and perform their role. Tonry, for instance, argued
they are ‘‘socialized into a prosecutorial rather than a primarily
judicial professional culture’’ and are thus more likely to be
‘‘moralistic and self-righteous, to stereotype defendants in negative
ways, to identify with victims, to care more about convictions than
exonerations, and to seek harsher punishments.’’ 247
The fact that participants learnt about their role vocationally
helped to explain why they attached value to experience over training
and understood the formal rules in occupational terms. Notwith-
standing this, most complained of the lack of specific prosecutorial
training available. No university or professional body offers or re-
quires such training. Whilst generalist law and advocacy skills were
instilled at university or before admission to the Bar, this failed to
prepare participants for practice. For PI2, ‘‘university…was com-
pletely inadequate. It’s got almost no practical application…I was so
green when it came to my first day on the job.’’ US2 believed, ‘‘it’s
always a problem learning on the job – that ‘‘seat of the pants’’ sort
of stuff. It’s a really hard way to learn. If you had the fundamentals,
you’d develop far, far more fully.’’
5.3.2 Personal Disposition and Conceptions of Purpose
Because participants learnt about their role vocationally, there was
variation in their dispositions and conceptions of their role in sen-
tencing. This derived from differences in experience, office-types,
internal and external training, and oversight. With respect to men-
toring, one participant explained:
…my old boss would talk about how the role was much more limited in the
past and how [the boss’s] view was that prosecutors shouldn’t advocate for a
certain sentence…[The boss] had the view that we shouldn’t even really be
making submissions on sentencing ranges…But obviously as time has gone by
prosecutors have had a much more active role.
(UJ1)
246 This is also the case in Australia. See C. Corns (above n 41) at para 3.60. In
England, most begin their careers after completing university, undergo extensive
professional training before starting work, and become career civil servants. See M.
Tonry (above n 2) at 17.
247 M. Tonry (above n 2) at 16–19.
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The great potential for such variation reinforced the individualistic or
subjective nature of discretion. Whilst participants sought to attain
their legal mandate’s broad aims, their discretion was ultimately
personal, and often exercised in private. Offices thus harboured
participants with over-lapping yet appreciably different frames.
Overall, senior participants better grasped the ‘‘fundamentals’’,
which reflected their maturity and experience. They discussed their
duties to be fair, independent, and to assist the court; they appreci-
ated these may require advocacy for an offender; and they expressed
distaste for overzealous or ‘‘jack-boot’’ prosecuting. This was espe-
cially complained of in relation to younger staff. Indeed, junior and
intermediate participants held more moralistic and self-righteous
views of their role. UJ2 remarked ‘‘it’s a lot more liberating being a
prosecutor when you know that your role is to be the most reasonable
person in the room.’’ PI1 stated, ‘‘I’d like to think judges see the
Crown more as their voice of reason because we’re working for the
community.’’
Participants also discussed how discretion made their jobs more
enjoyable and meaningful. US1 explained, ‘‘I enjoy exercising a bit of
discretion and I think [the judges] appreciate it – when they can see
somebody who uses their discretion, who can see the subtleties re-
quired.’’ For PI2, ‘‘I just like the court environment. The theatre of it.
The back and forward. I like the fact that you’re dealing with pretty
significant events in people’s lives.’’ UJ2 believed, ‘‘it’s quite liberat-
ing being able to apply [the Guidelines] in my own way [in sen-
tencing], without feeling like you are answerable to a client.’’
Unsurprisingly, participants resisted further regulation. Referring to
the possibility of a sentencing guidelines regime, US1 mused, ‘‘If we
had the American-type system…it wouldn’t be particularly stimu-
lating would it?’’
The above views also reflect how participants understood their
discretion’s ‘‘phenomology’’. 248 Whilst aware of their power and
autonomy to decide, most described their influence on sentencing in
non-discretionary or ‘‘axiomatic’’ ways.249 UJ1 stated, ‘‘I have the
discretion to submit. I don’t have the discretion to submit anything
that isn’t in accordance with the law…if I’m doing my job properly,
248 This describes extent to which people sense their choices are constrained or not.
See R. Lempert, ‘‘Discretion in a Behavioral Perspective: The Case of a Public
Housing Eviction Board’’, in K. Hawkins (ed) The Uses of Discretion (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992).
249 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
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then I have very little discretion.’’ PI1 opined, ‘‘There is actually a fair
amount of discretion when I look at it but I don’t see it as discre-
tion…it’s just like a process I have to work through to reach the final
sentence.’’ In reality participants held considerable power and framed
the version of reality that more senior colleagues, probation officers,
and sentencing judges received.
Notably, most participants perceived they had greatest discretion
in ‘‘marginal cases’’,250 namely those on cusp of a community-based
sentence. Sounding-out participants’ potential influence in this re-
gard, one senior participant opined:
I think we do have a bit of discretion, particularly around what you call the in-
out’…sentences…and that’s where, if the Crown advocates strongly for a
prison sentence, often the judge will think, Hmm. Maybe they’re right. We’ll
go with them.’ But if you say to the court, The Crown’s not strongly opposed
to a community-based sentence, if you feel you can reach that sentence’, you
almost give them permission to do what they want.
(PS1)
Such responses highlighted the applicability of Hawkins’ observation
that ‘‘when events or offences lack a taken for granted’ quality, the
decision-maker feels substantial latitude in deciding.’’251
5.3.3 Recommending Sentence
Participants ultimately varied on whether finite sentences should be
recommended or not. Most abided by the Guidelines and recom-
mended a sentence range due to a belief in judicial discretion’s
importance. Typical was US2’s remark: ‘‘Sometimes a range but
normally just a starting point…Not usually a year, a specific. I
wouldn’t. I just think the judge has to be left with some discretion.’’
Such views were explained by the perceived ‘‘instinctive’’ role of
sentencing judges:
…it’s not really our role to spell everything out because then we’re just
duplicating the role of the judge…I think there is still what they Australians
call instinctive synthesis’ – that the judges should be able to decide. That’s
what they’re paid the big bucks for.
(US1)
250 K. Hawkins (above n 5).
251 Ibid at 433.
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Such views were also explained by tradition. For PI2, ‘‘it’s to do
with…that tradition of respect. It’s the same reason we say, Your
Honour’, with respect’ and I submit’.’’
Participants’ abidance was also influenced by their duties to assist
and prevent the court from falling into appealable error. PS1 opined,
‘‘it does assist the judge because often they have no idea’’ and ‘‘if we
didn’t have that role, judges would be much more susceptible to
accepting outrageous submissions.’’ PI2 stated, ‘‘I normally do ran-
ges because that’s ultimately how the Court of Appeal will look at
it.’’252 A concern for consistency was also apparent. For instance,
UJ1 explained, ‘‘the purpose of the role is to give guidance to the
judge about consistency…like offenders who commit like sentences
should get a similar sentence no matter where they are.’’ Such views
highlight the tension that within New Zealand’s ‘‘comparative’’ ap-
proach, which strives for consistency in outcomes yet affords judicial
discretion a privileged role.
Significantly, some senior participants disclosed that variation
existed within their offices. US3 remarked, ‘‘there is probably a lot of
variation within our office, even at the senior level’’ and US1
admitted, ‘‘I’m not sure if the practice is standard across the office’’.
Certain participants also disclosed they or their staff recommended
finite sentences as a matter of office policy:
We will actually come up with…a specific calculation…down to the month of
sentence…which is a big difference…when I first started, or even 10 or 15 years
ago, you couldn’t say anything in terms of what the penalty was. You’d get a
clip around the ear.
(PS3)
UJ2 explained, ‘‘if we’re talking about a sentence of imprisonment,
I’d recommend a finite end sentence…If it’s going to be a community-
based sentence, you…leave it up to the court.’’ Although, with re-
spect to this latter aspect, UJ2 felt, ‘‘we should sometimes take a
stronger position by at least pinning our colours to the mast.’’
252 For similar reasons, there was reluctance to recommend finite uplifts or con-




This paper has explored the form, function, and limits of Crown
Prosecutors’ role in sentencing in New Zealand. In doing so, it has
sought to describe, understand, and evaluate the practice whereby
Crown Prosecutors recommend a sentence range or tariff to the court
in their written and oral submissions. The regimes of England and
Australia have been used as background features against which to
compare New Zealand’s regime.
In seeking to identify Crown Prosecutors’ role under existing law
and policy documents, this paper has shown it to be similar to its
English equivalent. Crown Prosecutors in both countries must not
press for a particular sentence but may submit a view as to the
appropriate sentence range or tariff. As highlighted, Australia has
recently stepped right back from this position as a result of its cul-
tural commitment to the ‘‘individualist’’ approach to sentencing and
its privileging of judicial discretion.
At least in New Zealand and England, therefore, the generalisa-
tion that Crown Prosecutors should play no part in sentencing ap-
pears to be well-rebutted in theory. That this is so can be evidenced
from the very substance of Crown Prosecutors’ prescribed sentencing
involvement, with formal rules guiding both the order and content of
their submissions in both countries, and with specific requirements
placed upon Crown Prosecutors to assist the court and prevent it
from falling into appealable error.
The said generalisation also appears increasingly well-rebutted in
practice, particularly in view of the understandings emanating from
the growing body of empirical research on prosecutors’ impact in
sentencing. This paper has drawn attention to the fact previous re-
search has shown prosecutors hold an increasingly assertive and
adjudicatory role in criminal justice systems, with sentencing deci-
sions often ‘‘anchored’’ by prosecutors’ first instance sentencing
recommendations or demands.
In seeking to shed light on Crown Prosecutors’ understanding of
their role in sentencing, this paper has lent further anecdotal support
to these bodies of prior research. In particular, participants’ views
have laid bare how, in fulfilling their various obligations in sentenc-
ing, Crown Prosecutors knowingly exert direct and indirect influence
on various procedural forms via their exercise of discretion and their
pursuit of penal aims throughout criminal justice process.
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Ultimately, notwithstanding their prescribed role, participants
views’ suggest whilst New Zealand’s regime shares key history,
principles, and structural features with the English and Australian
regimes, it goes further to permit Crown Prosecutors a more assertive
role in sentencing – one that allows them to recommend finite sen-
tences as a matter of office-policy or individual practice. This unique
ability to press for sentence is facilitated by the regime’s privatised
and decentralised form, the non-mandatory nature of its formal rules,
and the ‘‘hands-off’’ approach to its regulatory oversight.
In employing Hawkins’ framework of ‘‘surround’’, ‘‘field’’ and
‘‘frame’’, this paper has sought to better understand what Crown
Prosecutors’ explanations mean for current policy. Participants’
views have illustrated for the first time how Crown Prosecutors may
be affected by the current managerial and populist ‘‘surround’’. Such
pressures create marked frustration, strain, and concern in the deci-
sion-making ‘‘field’’. They also inspire entrepreneurial solutions to
those aspects of the regime that are perceived as deficient.
Participants’ views on the changes to the CPA and the Network
funding model, in particular, suggest the potential for unjust sen-
tencing outcomes has increased, with anecdotal evidence of incen-
tivised ‘‘plea-bargaining’’ apparent. Larger-scale empirical research is
needed here to determine the actual extent of such practices, their
connection to the new funding model, and their effect on sentencing
outcomes. Notable obstacles to data collection, accessibility and
transparency will need to be overcome first.
Participants’ views also make plain how the ‘‘surround’’ may in-
trudeuponand transformCrownProsecutors’ decision-making ‘‘field’’
and ‘‘frames’’. The opinions and presence of stakeholders – like sen-
tencing judges, defence counsel, victims, the Police, the media, and
pressure groups – may influence decisions and practices at both office
and individual levels. Justice may therefore be reactive, forward-
looking, or negotiated depending on the particular mix of individuals
involved. Because participants afford the formal rules variable status,
informal rules – like office policy – assume a particularly powerful role.
Considerable variation in practices, dispositions and conceptions of
purpose is thus possible in and between offices – something which is
facilitated further by the regime’s privatised and decentralised form.
Participants’ views further suggest that Crown Prosecutors tend to
‘‘frame’’ their role in occupational terms. The lack of interest of
universities, professional bodies, and law and policy-makers in
offering or requiring specific prosecutorial training before entry to the
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role is influential here. Participants learn ‘‘on the job’’ and are greatly
influenced by their office-type and hierarchy, and any mentoring and
oversight they receive. Most seem to know little about criminological
or peno-correctional philosophy, and have only a surface-level
appreciation of the social and ethical values which ought to dominate
the administration of criminal justice. It is likely that this renders
their decision-making more susceptible to pressures in the ‘‘sur-
round’’ and ‘‘field’’, and increases the scope for variation in their
‘‘frames’’. Future research could test these assertions via an experi-
mental or quasi-experimental design.
Ultimately, this study has sought to contribute to and strengthen
the literature on the prosecutorial exercise of discretion in sentencing.
It has also sought to expand comparative knowledge in this under-
studied area. Without more and better knowledge of the strengths
and weaknesses of different regimes – like that of New Zealand – we
are unable to effectively remedy weaknesses across the board; nor are
we able to learn ‘‘what kinds of systems promote values of equality,
justice, and rationality’’ within prosecutorial conduct.253 Whilst this
study has been limited to a qualitative focus and modest sample size,
my hopes are that it has nonetheless deepened present understanding,
and that it will inspire further detailed enquiry and better practices in
the future.
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253 M. Tonry (above n 2) at 27.
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